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INTRODUCTION 
This is a comparative study of the fiscal patterns of rural and urban counti es. The research 
is part of a larger project "Rural Development Impl ications of Employment Location" which concerns 
the interdependencies between regional employment, local government fiscal choices, public service 
delivery, commuting and/or migration, and structural changes in the regional economy. 
The empirical analysis of taxes and public spending by type of agent (farm, business, 
household) and by county provides the kind of information individuals consider when they vote, or 
when they "vote with their feet" (relocate) . It is often assumed that citizens are aware of the 
variations in tax burdens and benefits of different agents and in different places. This is highly 
unlikely, because no single government agency provides a comprehensive account of the complex 
vertical (local , state, and federal ), much less horizontal (school district, municipality, county, state) 
fiscal fl ows of taxes and government spending. Each jurisdictional entity maintains only its own 
accounts . 
The first object ive of this thes is is to develop a form of data organization that clearly shows 
who pays what taxes to whom, and , how the revenue is spent. The data format not onJy should be 
easy to read but also to extend to any state or region of interest. We will show it for the county areas 
of Iowa. The second objective is to analyze the data looking for patterns of fiscal situation 
(balance/imbalance) that differ across types of locations. These results may be useful for tax policy 
decisions, location, and residential choice analyses. 
I present a multi-region, multi-jurisdiction social accounting matrix (SAM) to organize the 
data on government revenue and expenditure. Fiscal SAMs are described in the third chapter. To 
construct this matrix one must document the fiscal flows to and from agents in each local jurisdiction 
and the state and federal government. To determine the appropriate attributes of the fiscal social 
accounting matrices, I surveyed the literature about public good provision, estimation of government 
revenues and expenditures, and previous stud ies of fiscal accounts in national income and product 
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accounting. The literature review follows this introduction. 
A social accounting matrix (SAM) is basically a matrix organization of data, for a given 
period of time, in rows and columns. The basic principle is that of double entry bookkeeping in 
accounting. What is incoming to one account must be outgoing from another. Each account consists 
of one row and one column, identically labeled. In a SAM, the double entries are represented by just 
one number in a matrix. This is the framework used to organize the government accounts data. The 
SAM matrix shows the fiscal flows for each level of government simultaneously. It also shows which 
agents pay or receive for each county area within the state and nation. The organization of data in 
a SAM framework is critical because it results in more complete and consistent fiscal accounts than 
any other method , and thus more accurate fiscal indicators . 
Despite its usefulness, there are virtually no precedents for the multiregional-
multijurisdictional SAM approach to fiscal accounting. Only a few textbooks on urban economics 
present a treatment appropriate to the study of intergovernmental relations (e.g., O'Sullivan, 1996). 
In addition, a book by Ladd and Yinger (1989) and the publications of the (soon to be disbanded) 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) give particular attention to this 
problem. The emphasis in these publications is on urban or metro area analysis. This thesis will 
study both rural and urban (metro/nonmetro) fiscal patterns. 
Actual data on the taxes and government expenditures for the 99 counties of Iowa, the state, 
and the USA is used to demonstrate this new accounting method. In this thesis, the 99 county SAMs 
appear in a more informative regional aggregates: metro/urban/rural. 
Once the fiscal data by county is correctly organized, I analyze the data to determine what 
patterns , if any, can be distinguished . A variety of measures of fiscal burdens, effort, and relative 
benefits are calculated for each county. Using multivariate analyses I test whether patterns in these 
fiscal measures relate to the ruraJ /urban characteristics of the counties. In other words, I will look 
for any conditionaJities between types of location and fiscal shape. This empiricaJ work is presented 
in the fourth chapter. 
Conclusions about differences in fiscal patterns between rural and urban counties are 
summarized in the last chapter. 
3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Fiscal Federalism 
Most government services that directly affect people's lives are administered by state and 
local governments. Examples of these are education, health , police and fire protection services, and 
transportation. Among the federal government programs, social security and defense are the most 
familiar to people. The federal government of the United States also provides intergovernmental 
transfers to lower levels of government to help finance the provision of education, health, 
transportation and other things. This system of shared finances as well as authority is known as 
"fiscal federalism" . 
The Constitution of the United States es tab I is hes that federal and state governments will share 
responsibilities to provide public goods. In 1992, total government expenditures amounted to about 
41 % of U.S. GNP.1 State and local governments expenditures amounted to about 19% of U.S. 
GNP. 
Local governments are the "creatures" of state governments, and from the states they derive 
their taxing and spending powers. Analyses across periods show that this federal system has always 
been changing. The government sector has developed into a complex set of institutions, with less 
and less clearly defined functions at each level (Swartz and Peck, 1990; Walzer and Chicoine, 1981). 
Most authors agree that the U.S. is no longer a system of federal coordination but one of federal 
cooperation (Oates,1991). 
The optimal jurisdiction size is also a complicated question. Due to scale and scope 
economies as well as externalities , public goods are appropriately provided to varying sizes of 
1. Calculated from Government Finances 1991-92 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1995), and 
Survey of Current Business: 1994. Federal transfers to state and local are excluded from federal 
expenditure and included as State and local expenditure. 
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clientele. This means that jurisdictions (market areas for public goods) are likely to overlap. 
Citizens may often be within the jurisdiction and taxing power of more than one local government, 
as well as of state and federal governments . A hierarchy of districts is called coherent if all units that 
belong to one level belong to one and the same district in the next level (Serra, 1996). For example, 
all 50 states belong to the U.S.A., and all 99 counties of Iowa belong to the State of Iowa. There 
are more than 86000 local governments ranging from counties to special districts whose functions 
vary from state to state. Many of these local units present some form of jurisdictional overlapping. 
In some cases this leads to non-coherent districts (i.e., a school district that crosses county 
boundaries), and complicates the presentation of multi-region multi-jurisdiction fiscal data. 
The system of federal cooperation has been studied by looking separately at each level of 
government. Despite the practical and theoretical importance of the relationships and 
interdependencies among different levels of government most emphasis is still on government 
accounts at each distinct level. Finally, since most research is for national audiences, an important 
part of it is dedicated to federal and state-local government finances (revenues versus spending), in 
two separate blocks. There are few studies concerning state and local fiscal accounts in any detail. 
Public Goods Provision 
The main responsibilities of central governments are, first , stabilization (Keynesian economic 
policy) and second , redistribution of income and wealth (social policy) (Musgrave and Musgrave, 
1959; Musgrave, 1976; Oates, 1977, and 199 1). This is because fiscal policy by a local entity is 
ineffective due to the openness of small reg ions and the mobility of the agents across regions. 
Furthermore, since economic cycles and social disparities are economy-wide but potentially of 
different levels of severity across regions, inter-community transfers and central coordination is most 
appropriate. 
Another important government function is to support the efficient allocation of resources. 
The resources of any economy are divided between private enterprise and public good provision. A 
particular mix of public goods must be chosen. Local governments, as well as the national 
government, play important roles in these choices through the ways in which tax revenues are 
collected and spent. 
There are cases in which the role of the national government in the provision of public goods 
has wide consensus. Public goods that are totally non-excludable and non-rival ( the 'pure' public 
5 
goods) and whose benefits are nation-wide should be provided by the central government. When the 
distribution of benefits is spatially limited, or, when there is some level of excludability and/or 
rivalness, lower levels of government may have a role. 
Following the seminal papers about public good provision by Samuelson (1954) and Tiebout 
(1956) there has been a considerable amount of theoretical research about "bow much and what mix 
of public goods should be provided?" In a federal system, like that of the U.S., the discussion about 
the role of local governments in public goods provision has became an important piece of the 
literature. In Tiebout's model, frequently viewed as a guide to the optimal mix and level of public 
goods at the local level, consumers reveal their preferences by "voting with their feet" (migrating). 
According to Tiebout "there is no way in which the consumer can avoid revealing his preferences in 
a spatial economy." Heikkila (1996) found that municipalities in Los Angeles county behave as 
Tieboutian clubs. His results show census tracts mapping into homogeneous groups: municipalities. 
He also found that there may be higher level clustering, not necessarily coincident with geographical 
boundaries . 
Tiebout's model is also seen as the origin of club theory. Cornes and Sandler (1986) define 
club as a voluntary group that derives excludable benefits from sharing production costs, members' 
characteristics and/ or excludable goods. Under this mechanism there should be a tendency towards 
the formation of homogeneous communities in terms of preferences for local public goods. One 
important assumption implicit here is that people have full knowledge of the differences among 
communities. In particular, they must know the revenue-expenditure behavior of each local 
government. 
The advantages of local provision of public goods, and the benefits of inter-jurisdictional 
competition have been argued by many in the literature (Zodrow,1983; Rosen, 1995; Mills and 
Hamilton, 1995). Efficiency gains from local control over the services provided as well as lower 
costs are on the pros side. Arguments against local control include multiplication or proliferation of 
costs when there is a large number of jurisdictions (Zax, 1988). If local governments are too small , 
it is impossible for them to capture any economies of scale. Small jurisdictions also have difficulty 
internalizing benefits that otherwise spill over outside their jurisdiction. Also, the more numerous 
are local governments the more opportunities there are for administrative mismanagement. 
In the discussion about local public goods provision and appropriate jurisdictional size, two 
key concepts are efficiency and equity. There is always a trade--0ff or compromise between them. 
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Efficiency in public goods provision is commonly defined as the level in which there is no possibility 
of making someone better off without making someone worse off. According to that definition 
taxation is almost always inefficient. However, we can agree that taxes have a positive counterpart 
in the goods and services provided by the government. In this context efficiency refers to 'as 
efficient as possible' (Baumol and Blinder, 1995). To take advantage of economies of scale or to 
internalize all benefits may require a large jurisdiction size. To allow for individual control over the 
packages of goods and services to be provided (the issues of revelation and homogeneity of 
preferences) may require a small jurisdiction size. 
Equity is a criterion concerned with fairness . One equity principle : horizontal equity, may 
be stated as "equal treatment of equals." Individuals in the same situation should be taxed or 
benefitted the same way. All individuals have the right to enjoy the same benefits of public goods -
at least some minimum amount- everywhere. They should pay the same for a given level of public 
goods. A good example is education. Due to scale economies, larger jurisdictions may be 
advantageous. On the other hand, smaller regions are more likely to be populated by citizens with 
more homogeneous tax capacities and public good needs (Benabou, 1996). 
Oates (1991) makes explicit the tension between the concept of economic efficiency and 
equity considerations regarding minimum service provision. To ensure this minimum has been one 
important purpose of intergovernmental grants. The argument about the advantages of lump-sum 
grants and more specific grants is the same as that between the benefits of local autonomy from an 
efficiency point of view and the necessity for commonly prescribed standards for equity reasons. 
Vertical equity is another version of equity. It is based on the 'ability to pay' principle. 
People with a high ability to pay (income, property assets, etc.) should pay higher taxes. This 
concept undergirds the progressivity of the tax system, and enlargement of jurisdictions may work 
against it because of changes in the tax mix ( property, income, profit, etc.) or because of the 
distribution formulas (per head, per acre, per dollar). 
A third concept of equity concerns benefits relative to burdens: those who receive the benefits 
should pay the taxes. This is a controversial notion in that it conflicts with the notion of what is a 
public good (nonexcludability and nonrivalness). It is also a principle that works better among small, 
homogeneous groups. 
This thesis does not attempt to answer the questions about which local public goods should 
be provided or what is the optimal jurisdiction size. It does provide, however, a framework to 
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document fiscal accounts suitable for investigating variations across types of regions in vertical, 
horizontal, and burden/benefit versions of equity. The framework should also make it possible to 
document changes in these patterns over time. 
Interdependencies 
The federal government supports local public good provision in mainly two ways: direct 
operation of programs (e.g. social security), or by providing funds to lower levels of governments 
(e.g. education). The funds that the federal government gives to state and local governments are 
usually referred to as intergovernmental transfers , grants, or grants in aid . Intergovernmental funds 
come in various forms: (i) Lump-sum grants are monies provided with minimal constraints on their 
use. They may be unconditional: no constraint at all , just a grant (i.e. general revenue sharing, until 
1986); or conditional: earmarked for a specific program, or area of a program. The sum of grants 
for a program is called a block grant. (ii) Categorical grants are directed to narrowly defined 
activities. Another way to characterize grant money is by looking at the matching requirements. 
Matching grants specify an amount of federal money for each dollar (total) spent in a program. That 
means the recipient government has an obligation to match the federal money at a specified rate. 
Matching grants may be closed-end or open-end depending on the specification of a maximum amount 
for the federal grant. Matching grants are usually identified with categorical grants but there are 
some block grants with matching requirements, for example "ground transportation block grants" in 
fiscal year 1993. (iii) Tax expenditures are implicit grants . They consist mainly of deductibility of 
local taxes and exemption of interest from local bonds when paying federal taxes. This type of 
operation is sometimes viewed as a way of tax exportation for the local levels of governments. By 
deducting local taxes from the tax base, tax payments to the federal government are reduced. There 
is no agreement on how to measure the deductibility effects. 
Particular attention has been given in the literature to the evolution and changes in the 
composition of federal intergovernmental transfers (Gold, 1990; Bahl, 1990). Intergovernmental 
flows grew steadily in the postwar period becoming an important source for the growing expenditures 
by lower levels of governments until 1976. In the recent two decades, there has clearly been a 
reduction in the level of federal support, and a shift of fiscal financial responsibility to state and local 
governments. This shift in responsibilities has been viewed as driven by a change in the focus of 
policies from welfare issues to economic development, or, from distributional to efficiency issues. 
8 
Gold (1995), notes a reversal in this federal aid trend after 1992. Federal aid to lower levels 
recovers to near 15 % of the federal outlay (calculated from data in the U.S. Statistical Abstract, 
1995), a share similar to that of the 1970s. 
The devolution of fiscal responsibilities to lower levels of government means that local areas 
may suffer because there are differences in fiscal capacity (in the sense of "ability [of local 
government] to perform") across jurisdictions. Multi-state analyses of the decade 1975-85 have 
shown that one way or another, states have managed the increasing responsibility and "they are doing 
well" (Shannon , 1990). By raising sales truces, user charges, and royalties, for example; and also by 
increasing income truces; lower level governments have been able to compensate for the decreased 
federal support. 
Gramlich (1990) has compared a normative model of what a federal system should do with 
the actual structure of expenditures and truces. What each level of the federal system should do is 
analyzed according to the general criteria of range of externalities or spill-<>ver of benefits and 
possibilities of policy application (redistribution of income at local level may induce local mobility). 
His conclusions are that with a few exceptions, which can be corrected, the system is working well , 
in the sense that each level is doing what it is supposed to do . 
Desp ite the dearth of state-local empirical studies , analysts are quite aware that there are 
variations in the fiscal capacities and costs of local public goods provision across states. National 
economic situations affect the ability of local governments to provide public services in different ways 
across communities. In addition, communities have idiosyncratic problems. Fiscal problems may 
come from mismanagement or bad decisions, from historical , economic or geographical 
disadvantages, because of preferences for high-quality services, or because of severe true limitations 
set by their state. Given the importance of local public services provision and its dependence on 
transfers from higher levels of government, we need more detail about intergovernmental fiscal flows 
and interjurisdictional equity. 
Empirical Studies 
One strand of empirical research focuses on the historical evolution of the federal system, 
showing the path, as well as the broader components , of total expenditures. First, the data is 
analyzed to show changes, at an aggregate level, in revenues and expenditures at each level of 
government. Figure I shows the evolution of aggregated governmental spending in terms of GNP. 
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Figure 1 TotaJ Government Expenditures 
Total government expenditure grew between 1929 and 1975. The next decade was one of small ups 
and downs, and , since 1985 total government expenditure has been fairly constant in terms of GNP. 
However, the composition of total government expenditure has changed over the period. ln the early 
years, state and local expenditures accounted for over 753 of the total (federal was less than 25 3). 
This pattern reversed after World War II, with state and local expenditures falling to about one third 
of the totaJ by 1949. From then to 1975 state and local spending grew to more than 403 oftbe total , 
then again decreased until 1980, rose again and stayed near 503 since 1981 (Child Hill , 1990; 
Shannon, 1990; Mills and Hamilton, 1995). 
The main expenditures of the federal government have been, without big changes , for social 
security and national defense (Figure 2) . By 1992, transfers to states and local governments 
comprised nearly 12 3 of the federal budget. The biggest program of state and local spending is 
education (Figure 3), which accounts for about 303 of the state budget and more than 37% of the 
local (on average). State government expenditures on welfare programs are also important, accounting 
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Figure 2 Composition of Federal Expenditures, 1992. 
for about 213 of total state expenditures in 1992 (revenue and spending composition is calculated 
using Government Finances 1991-92 (U.S Department of Commerce, 1995) and U.S. Statistical 
Abstract, 1995.) The second type of empirical research analyzes changes in the sources of revenue 
and the objects of expenditure. About 45% of the federal government revenue for fiscal year 1992 
came from individual income taxes . This proportion has not varied since 1960. Social insurance 
revenues have increased from about 16% to 37%, and the share from corporation taxes has dropped 
from 233 to less than 103. 
For the states , about 41 % of their revenue (includ ing borrowing) in 1992 came from sales 
taxes, 21 % from intergovernmental funds (federal sources) and the rest in similar proportions from 
individual income, charges and "miscellaneous", and insurance trust. 
Local governments have bas ically two sources of revenue: intergovernmental transfers, which 
was the most important until the l 970's, and property taxes . In 1992, the average local government 
got 403 of its total revenue fro m property taxes and another 40 % from intergovernmental funds. 
The remaining 20 % came from other taxes and charges. 
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Figure 3 Composition of State and Local Expenditures, 1992. 
Estimating Revenue and Expenditure 
While the federal government uses its ability to buy and sell bonds along with its ability to 
debt-finance fi scal operations, state and local governments are subject to some constraints. Local 
levels may not carry deficits , even though they may have surpluses for use in the future . States may 
set their own limits on budgetary imbalances , but in many cases (e.g., Iowa) they choose to balance 
their budgets. In order to know how taices or spending should be adjusted to maintain budget 
balance, state and local governments need to be able to predict both revenues and expenditures. 
The Tiebout hypothesis about revelation of preferences for local public goods has suggested 
reduced form models popular for estimating government expenditure. Local expenditure is regressed 
against per capita income, per capita grants in aid and socio-economic characteristics like population 
density and ethnic composition, unemployment rates, and land area: 
X = crib + {JA, + 01 U + O:zL + ... + f 
where: X is expenditure (typically state plus local government expenditure); lb is per capita 
(individual or household) income; A, is per capita federal aid ; U is the unemployment rate; L is land 
area. This model is estimated assuming normally distributed errors, f. 
12 
The implications from these models have always been consistent with common sense. 
Expenditures are shown to be positively correlated with income, federal aid, and land area, as well 
as with any characteristic that identifies social disadvantages like high unemployment rates or high 
percentages of nonwhite population. There is some disagreement about whether expenditure is 
positively or negatively associated with population density and degree of urbanization. Bahl (1990), 
claims that there may be some advantages to urban agglomerations. 
Even though it is still used as a partial strategy (Bahl , 1990), this demand-side approach of 
the public sector problem has been seriously criticized (Inman, 1979; Hutten and Schwab, 1988). 
Two of the most evident weak points are (i) the aggregation of state and local expenditures and (ii) 
the treatment of grants-in-aid. First, consideration of state and local expenditures together in a model 
of an aggregation of small areas may give an erroneous idea of the behavior of the individual areas. 
Because of the differences between these smaller units, their individual reactions may be far off the 
average. The model results may be not valid for a particular small jurisdiction. Second, the 
treatment of grants suffers a problem of simultaneity: does more grant money cause more 
expenditures, or does more expenditure require more grant money? But there is also a problem of 
specification. There are two main categories of grants: lump-sum and matching grants, with distinct 
effects on local budgets. Lump-sum grants have no restrictions and so they have clearly a pure 
income effect, i.e. , relax the budget constraint. A matching grant intends to stimulate spending on 
a targeted service and, as we said before, requires matching funds from the local entity. This means 
that for every dollar spent by the local government on a program, they can provide more than a 
dollar's worth of that service. Thus, matching grants affect relative "prices" and changes cause both 
an income and a substitution effect. 
Figure 4 shows the different outcomes that wiJI arise in general in a two goods case under 
these two forms of budget change. This figure contrasts the effects of the same amount of 
intergovernmental transfer in the form of lump sum or matching grant on the level and mix of public 
goods provided. In case (a) , preferences are illustrated as homothetic: neither of the public goods 
(x and y) is more a necessity or luxury than the other. The optimally chosen mix of goods clearly 
depends on whether the intergovernmental transfer merely relaxes the budget constraint or whether 
it alters the relative provision costs to the local government. Even though some deviation of resources 
is unavoidable, the price effect that a matching grant causes ensures that a higher proportion of the 
money goes to the targeted good. 
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Figure 4 Lump-Sum versus Matching Grants 
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Decisions about the mix and level of public goods provision also depend on local preferences. 
In figure 4 , case (b) illustrates non-homothetic preferences. Intergovernmental funds that are lump-
sum clearly favor the provision of "luxury" public goods. It is also possible that the quantity of the 
targeted good is proven to be inferior after the lump-sum grant when it is a necessity type of good 
(x in the diagram). 
Empirical research , summarized by Inman (1979), found the demand for most public services 
to be mildly inelastic with respect to prices . An income elasticity also inferior to unity (inelastic) was 
found for most of the services except housing, recreation and welfare. In particular, some results 
for the effects of lump-sum aid over expenditures were much lower than the determinant models 
found . In other words, lump-sum money is more likely to just replace local spending. 
A third problem with the demand-side estimation of expenditure is an omitted variables 
problem. There is no hypothesis testing. Only available data on demand determinants is used. In 
general , this threatens the validity of conclusions because of the possible omission of significant 
(potentially correlated) variables. Pidot (1969) recognizes this double problem of traditional 
approaches: omitted variables and also ex istence of multicollinearity when a larger number of 
explanatory variables is considered. He uses a principal component analysis to reduce thirty original 
variables to s ix uncorrelated compo nents . This method ensures accounting for much more variable 
effects on the level of government expenditures, without the problem of correlation. 
An alternative way to predict revenue and expenditure s imultaneously is to pose a problem 
of preference maximization subject to a budget constraint (Henderson, 1968; Gramlich , 1969; Inman, 
1979). The idea is that any level of government, each with its own peculiarities , faces the problem 
of financing public goods provision. This framework seems suitable for the analysis of the effects 
of policy changes on the allocation of government budgets, but it is also useful for analyzing the 
question of the optimal size and number of jurisdictions. Bahl and Puryear (1976) , Oates and Wallis 
(1988), and Zax (1988) do not formally state it but th eir research may be seen as applying this 
framework . 
A very s imple specification of the model would start by considering an objective function of 
the form: 
(1) U(G,Y), 
where U is a continuous, quasi-concave utility function representing personal preferences over local 
services output (G) and disposable private income (Y) (income plus transfers minus taxes) . In other 
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words, each person chooses a mix of public and private goods. 
Legally, local governments should balance revenues and expenditures. Thus, the choice is 
subject to a budget constraint: 
(2) Rev = Exp . 
Government revenues come from taxes raised from the community (T) plus intergovernmental aid 
from state and federal government (A). Their expenditures are determined by the amounts of labor 
(L), capital (K), and other intermediate products (OI) they need to produce a certain amount of public 
services. 
The level of service that each person or household enjoys (Gru) depends only on the output 
of each service (QJ and the total number of persons in the community (N): Ghi = g(Q;, N), where 
h refers to a particular unit of consumption (household or individual) and i refers to a specific type 
of public good or service. More precisely it is accepted that 
(3) Gbi = Q;f N . 
Assuming, for simplicity, exogenous factor prices and a linear homogeneous production function (so 
we have constant average costs) we can express total spending as: E; c; • Q;, where C; is the average 
cost that depends on factor prices. Then the budget constraint (2) states that tax revenue plus aid 
must cover costs of provision: 
( 4) T + A = E i C; • Q; . 
People's preferences are defined over the vector of public services (G) and disposable income 
(Y) which reflects the consumption of private goods. This second element in the objective function 
may be used to translate the aggregate budget constraint into an individual one. Disposable income 
for each household (h) is defined by: 
(5) Yh = ~ - Tb , 
where Ih is before- tax income and Tb are the effective taxes paid by the household. Tb is net to take 
into account possible tax credits. Using equation (5) we can get an expression for T and using (3) 
one for Q;. Substituting these expressions for Th and Q; into (4) and aggregating over all households 
we have the budget constraint expressing the income (plus transfers) expenditure relationship that 
covers public goods and disposable income: 
(6) I + A = E c, • G; + Y . 
The solution to the constrained optimization problem provides demand equations for each public good 
(GJ and another for private good consumption that depend on prices and income (I). 
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This is a very simplified exposition of the problem of optimal public good provision. Many 
major issues remain to be considered, such as: how are utility functions defined?, whose preferences 
(if all are not identical)?, and , what about debt financing? . The "median voter" assumption is a 
popular approach to the first issue. Other social choice models are also used. The intertemporal 
issue is considered by Inman (1979) and Hulten and Schwab (1988). 
Another oversimplification is the assumption of constant returns to scale technology for public 
good provision. It is not realistic. It is important to have a more accurate specification of the 
production process. Service output and factor inputs are actually simultaneously determined. We 
should include a production function as another constraint in the model. We know there are very 
important scale effects in public goods prov ision. This means that a flexible functional form that can 
be homogeneous of degree other than one should be estimated. Also, between public and private 
goods consumption there are other variables, besides number of persons, to be considered . Most 
goods and services provided by government share some degree of non-rivalry and non-excludability. 
We discuss below how an exponent between 0 and 1 on N is one way to account for non-rivalry . 
But because of these characteristics, sp ill-over effects or environmental interdependencies are 
expected. Hence, how much people benefit from public expenditures depends also on the magnitude 
of these effects. An example is expenditure on education. There is evidence that achievements vary 
across different environments. Hanushek (1995), in an updated review of the studies about public 
education, shows the importance of cultural level of classmates in individual's achievement. 
As we mentioned before, here public goods are treated as totally rival ("private") goods. 
Completely congestable goods may be assumed fo r simplicity, but then one of the intrinsic 
characteristics of a public good would be ignored. To allow fo r non-rival effects, the model should 
state equation (3) using N to the power of 7r , where 7r in the interval (0, I) represents the degree of 
rivalness, from 7r=O (non-rival) to 7r= I (completely rival) . Empirical estimates of demands for 
public goods, through non-market techniques, have focused on estimating this (7r) exponent to test 
for the degree of rivalry or congestion (Cornes and Sandler, 1986). 
There are practical problems with how intergovernmental aid (A) is measured and modelled. 
First, A should be disaggregated into A, (federal) plus A, (state): 
(7) A = A,+ A, . 
Second, lump-sum and matching funds must be treated separately: 
(8) Ar = A0 + Arm , 
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(9) A. = A.1 + A,m , 
where the second subscripts I and m stand for lump-sum and matching funds respectively. 
The budget constraint for this case would have the form: 
(10) T + An + A.1 =}:; C;(l-m;) • Q; , 
where 111; is the proportion of cost paid through matching grants from federal and /or state 
government. 
Finally, there is the data problem. To properly estimate these models , at local levels, we 
must be able to distinguish block from categorical grants. It is necessary to have data on at least the 
total amount of lump-sum transfers (An + A.1) and the specific matching rates. 
The next chapter will explain a format for organizing published information on fiscal flows 
in a way that helps highlight these distinctions while keeping track of total outlays and revenues . 
Measuring Fiscal Performance 
There has been interest in interstate differences in fiscal performance for a long time, but the 
topic has gained importance each time big changes in federal policies are contemplated. 1996 is one 
of those times. Traditionally, analysts and policy makers have relied on various indicators of fiscal 
"capacity" and "effort" to address how to distribute intergovernmental grants or how to help 
depressed areas provide a minimum level of services. 
Citizens of each state and local government may choose to use their own tax rates to finance 
local public goods provision. Thus actual revenue collected varies according to local rates and locally 
desired spending levels. To measure "fiscal capacity" is to determine how much revenue could be 
raised with common taxes at common rates. 
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) has been working on 
improving measures of fiscal capacity and effort at least since the 1960's. Their 1986 report provides 
a good summary of the available indicators of fiscal capacity, pros and cons of the various measures, 
and their different uses. The report emphasizes the distinction between individual ability to pay taxes 
and other levies and the government ability to raise revenues. The ability to pay taxes is a function 
of the individuals' personal income, while the governments' ability to tax depends not only on 
personal income but also on the tax instruments and bases available: property resources, types of 
businesses, and the local composition of taxable resources; as well as on their opportunity to expon 
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taxes. The ACIR criticizes indexes based solely on personal per capita income (which are widely 
used) because such indexes emphasize only the individual ability to pay taxes and ignore other tax 
bases . 
Other indicators, based on gross product or taxable resou rces, may have advantages in terms 
of the span of resources covered but they are still based on individual ability to pay. Two indexes 
are proposed as more suitable measures of governments fiscal capabilities: the Representative Tax 
System {RTS) and the Representative Revenue System (RRS). Those indexes try to take into account 
not only all revenue sources and types inside the region, but also revenue coming from outside (e.g., 
tax exporting). They differ in that the latter includes all government revenue, while the former 
includes onJy taxes. RTS and RRS indexes are not available yet at the sub-state level (ACIR, 1986). 
The problem of tax export is especially important when trying to assess the burden that a 
particular community carries. The fiscal capacity of a given area does not depend only on its local 
bases but also on non-resident induced activities. The levy of tax on income or product at its origin 
raises costs and thus price. It may be passed forward or backward depending on the elasticity of 
demand. If e ither backward or forward transactions involve out-of-region agents, taxes may be 
"exported" out of the region. A recent study by Morgan et al. (1996) identifies measurement 
problems and presents an evaluation of regional tax exporting . They analyze tax exporting between 
U.S. regions (defined as groups of states) and its relation to economic growth and welfare. They 
found different levels of tax exporting between regions and also in the same region under different 
scenarios. Another way of tax exporting is in the system of state-local tax deductibility from federal 
government taxes . However there are no estimates of the importance or magnitude of this type of 
tax exporting. 
Revenue "capacity" (C,) of any particular area is defined as the total amount of revenue that 
would result by applying , within the area, the national average rate for each State-Local revenue 
source: 
(11) c = ~ . t . • a. 
r L,, 1 "1 · "' 
where r is region, t; is national average tax rate on base i (calculated as total collection nationwide 
divided by total national base for that tax or revenue), and B;, is the appropriate tax or revenue base 
estimated for each region. To allow for comparisons between regions , an index of fiscal capacity is 
constructed by dividing the region capacity per capita over the U.S. capacity per capita. 
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Regardless of the definition or measure of capacity, revenue "effort" is the expression of the 
percentage relation between actual amount of revenue raised by a government and its hypothetical 
capacity: 
( 12) Er= ( L iR;,)/Cr , 
where Rir is the actual tax collection on tax base i for a particular region. The actual amount of 
revenue raised depends on the particular level of taxes in that region and on the proportion of the 
estimated base that is being used. 
According to ACIR ( 1991) (Measuring Fiscal Capacity, various years), Iowa had a fiscal 
capacity of 93% ( RTS based) with respect to U.S. total , ranking 28th among the 50 states, and 
100% of fiscal effort (ranking 15), in 1991 (Figure 5) . If RRS is used , Iowa's fiscal capacity 
amounted to 92 % of the total U.S ., and its fiscal effort to 106, ranking 7th among the 50 states . 
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Figure 5 Iowa Capacity and Effort (Source: ACIR, 1991 ) 
Actually, Iowa's fiscal capacity is a little lower than the national average: sources of revenue 
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(i.e., nominal incomes, taxable property valuations) are lower than average. The 100% effort index 
shows that Iowa extracts all the taxes it can in terms of the national representative rate. However, 
the historical evolution shows that Iowa's capacity was over 100% until 1981-82, when farm property 
values suffered a crisis. In fact, agriculture's property taxes declined as a percentage of total 
property taxes and also with respect to assessed values, about that period. (During 1983 agricultural 
residential property was moved to the residential category which has distorted comparability over 
time.) The fiscal effort index has been almost a mirror image of the capacity index during the period. 
This implies a fairly stable revenue index over the same period. 
Urban Economics, first concerned about the decline of big cities, has also emphasized the 
necessity of "fiscal health" measures and the importance of "community" analysis (O'Sull ivan, 1996; 
Mills and Hamilton, 1995). The focus of empirical analyses in this area has been specifically a city 
or a MSA. The question about the performance of local governments is not a simple question about 
how much revenue they raise nor even about having balanced budgets (legally they must) but a 
question about how they work. Are the services provided the quality and quantity people want, or, 
do they pay for what they get? Part of the research in the Tiebout tradition maintains that local 
governments are doing well. Through capitalization in housing values of the fiscal differences, 
consumers ultimately pay the "right" prices for local public services and local governments are 
providing what is demanded (Hamilton, 1983; Mills and Hamilton, 1995). In this way, efficient 
provision of public goods would be achieved. However, there are claims that more work is needed 
to fully understand this issue. The fact that not only fiscal differences but also other amenities are 
capitalized into household values complicates things. Decisions to vote with one's feet may be not 
only based on the package of services and taxes offered by each government (Rose-Ackerman, 1983). 
And there are also equity implications in this mechanism: it may be the base of intolerable differences 
in the quality of public services across localities . The equity and efficiency trade-Qffs mean that each 
aspect should be considered explicitly . 
Bennet (1980) compares fiscal situations among regions. He summarizes the results of studies 
based on different measures . Bennet defines.fiscal capacity in terms of the specific tax base, either 
using a representative set of tax bases as ACIR does, or, just money income for individual income 
taxes, property values for property taxes, and so on. Fiscal effon (E;,) is measured as the ratio of 
revenue raised (R,,.) to fiscal capacity (Ci,) for each revenue source: 
(13) E;, = R)C;, , 
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where subscript i denotes source and r denotes region. 
Then be describes two concepts that may be useful in comparing effort between regions. First, fisca/ 
pressure is shown as actual effort index against the change in effort relative to effort in a base year. 
Second, fiscal severity shows bow local effort has changed as local income changed. He plots the 
level of revenue collected for different combinations of effort and capacity to illustrate fiscal severity. 
Bennet also proposes a final fiscal incidence (FFl.) measure defined as benefits (expenditures in) 
minus burden (revenue from) by income group. A simplified formulation may be: 
(14) FFI.= E; cir· Qir - E; Rir , 
The first part of the right hand side of (14) represents the expenditures into a region on public goods 
and services, and the second part expresses tax revenues paid by agents in the region. While it is easy 
to identify the amount of tax revenue paid (abstracting from issues of tax exporting) it may be very 
difficult to identify the orientation of actual payments received by the suppliers of public goods and 
services for the region. Education services provided to region X may be paying for salaries to 
teachers residing in neighboring region Y, for example. This data problem will be addressed in the 
next chapter. Pommerehne (1977) proposes the same measure for fiscal incidence at each level of 
government and overall. 
A variation called final fiscal transfers is identified by Bennet as expenditure spill-overs minus 
tax export to other jurisdictions. ACIR and Ladd and Yinger (1989) present estimates of tax 
exporting. 
Ladd and Yinger (1989) report that most work is just an analysis of the trends in socio-
economic factors, rather than any investigation of how these factors influence fiscal situations, 
especially at the city level. To measure the city's ability to raise revenue, they propose the use of 
a uniform tax burden on the residents, instead of just an average tax rate. Actually, they criticize the 
ACIR system because it ignores intercity differences. Their index of standardized fiscal health 
focuses on revenue capacity and expenditure needs of a city. Revenue raising capacity (RRC.) 
depends on t~ burden on the community residents, measured as proportion of income: 
(15) RRC. = K • Y pc(l +e), 
where K is the standard burden, Y pc is the per capita income and e stands for the proportion of non 
residents tax base (taxes that the community is able to "export). 
Expenditure needs are calculated as the amount of revenue necessary to provide average 
services per capita in each city. Standard needs (SN.) are the sum of cost indexes for a selection of 
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public services in each city weighted by city differences with respect to the average. Stated in a very 
simplified form: 
(13) SN, =Li wirCiir , 
where wir are the region weights for each selected service and Clir are the costs indexes for each 
service in the region. 
Standardized fiscal health is the difference between revenue-raising capacity (RRC,) and 
standard expenditure needs (SN,), expressed as percentage of capacity: 
(14) (RRC,-SN,)/RRC, . 
This index is then compared with "actual" situations. Actual revenues include variation due to 
restrictions imposed by states (taxing allowed and responsibilities assigned). Actual revenue also 
include intergovernmental transfers. Since intergovernmental transfers provide an average of 40% 
of local government revenues, this inflow is important in leveling (or exacerbating) differences across 
regions. 
Data Organization 
To date, available fiscal data is usually organized in separate tables showing revenues and 
expenditures of a single level of government: local , state or federal. Government data is also often 
presented aggregated nationally within each level (e.g. all local counties or all 50 states) . Fiscal 
accounts aggregated nationally at each level of government have been used in early empirical studies 
of the three tasks of government: stabilization, redistribution, and allocation (Engerman, 1965; 
Netzer, 1969). 
In a paper presented to the Conference on Regional Accounts, Burkhead (1964) summarized 
an important part of the previous research about the treatment of the public sector in regional 
accounts. Regional (sub-national) consideration of public finances issues, and also that of separate 
accounts for the different levels of government, are his main concerns. Burkhead proposed that 
detailed accounts of revenues and expenditures be published for each of the three levels: federal , 
state, and local. Now, the actual presentations of tables from the Census of Governments, and other 
government finance publications , are very close to what Burkhead proposed. An abstraction of his 
original proposal is shown in Appendix I. 
Bennet (1980) proposed a matrix representation of the different levels of government activity. 
He presented a matrix structure to show the vertical and horizontal interrelations: the movement of 
23 
funds between national and lower levels of governments as well as between units at the same level. 
Fiscal 'burden' and fiscal 'benefits' for a specified jurisdiction could be calculated with a similar 
matrix. Table 1 is a simplified version of Bennet's revenue matrix . 
The idea behind Bennet's proposal is that intergovernmental flows are important to a region's 
fiscal performance. The matrix representation suggested helps to visualize clearly a set of 
interrelations among different levels of government. Two aspects of the problem, however, need 
more discussion. First, he shows the flow of spending into the community separated from the flow 
of revenue raised in the same community. Because of that separation, some of the interconnections 
may be hidden. (It is not clear how one would compare what one region pays with what it receives.) 
Second, Bennet measures "benefits" as the level of public good expenditures undertaken by the 
government with respect to the region . It is not necessarily true that the costs of public good 
provision measures the benefits received, nor is it always true that expenditure is incurred as income 
within the region. 
Table 1 Revenue Matrix (Bennet) 
Specif. Juris . Higher Level Similar Level Total 
Specified revenue raised grants and local transfers Total revenue 
Jurisdiction and spent locally intergov. (paym.for raised locally 
transfers shared 
services) 
Higher Level revenue transfers revenue raised revenue total revenue 
to higher levels and spent at transfers to raised at 
higher level higher levels higher level 
Similar Level local transfers grants and revenue raised total revenue 
(paym. for transfers to and spent in for other 
shared services) other similar other areas similar areas 
governm. 
Just because a particular region has a higher level of spending on public safety does not 
means that it enjoys more protection. It could be because it has a greater rate of crime. 
Should the benefits be measured on a cost basis or on a welfare basis? When government 
spends money we presume it benefits the community in the form of services provided (e.g . higher 
safety standards or better roads). However, spending on salaries or purchases of goods does not 
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necessarily stay within the community . The place of residence of people receiving saJaries from the 
government and the locations of industries providing goods and services to the government are the 
actuaJ determinants of ' which ' community receives those funds . 
Finally, there are the problems of measuring benefit spill-overs and tax export, that have 
aJready been mentioned. Consider spillovers in Bennet"benefits matrix": if benefits are measured by 
the level of spending, then spillovers must be represented by side payments between similar level 
jurisdictions . Note that one motivation for federal aid to local governments is precisely the fact that 
spillovers of benefits across regions would otherwise be externalities not enjoyed by local taxpayers. 
Federal taxing and funding internalizes costs/benefits. 
Ideal FiscaJ Accounts 
Fiscal federal ism means that federal, state and local governments are interdependent. 
Unfortunately, there is no standard way to document the various forms of interdependency. The ideal 
framework would present local, state, and federal flows simultaneously and would highlight 
intergovernmentaJ grants between levels . 
People may react to uneven fiscal burdens or benefits by migrating (fiebout Hypothesis). 
Thus , the ideal fiscal accounts will make it possible to compare one location with another taking all 
taxes and benefits into account, not just local ones. Local governments cannot redistribute income 
across regions . Federal programs do redistribute across regions. Local public goods/tax packages 
may vary because locaJ preferences vary and people "vote with their feet". But the true fiscal status 
of local areas also depends on state and federal flows in/out of the area. 
The ideal accounts should display data on taxes paid relative to expenditures so that the 
various measures of effort and equity may be calculated , consistently, for each jurisdiction relative 
to others. 
Local and state governments need to be able to predict revenues and expenditures subject to 
balanced budget policies. Typical accounting formats are already being used that satisfy this need. 
The ideal framework for fiscal accounts should also enable one to: (i) identify the allocation 
of spending, by each level of government, on different programs or on intergovernmental transfers; 
(ii) differentiate lump-sum (block) from categoricaJ or matching grants; (iii) document the amount 
of government spending on goods, services, wages and salaries , rents , and transfers received by 
industries and people, by region. In the next chapter I will develop the "social accounting matrix" 
framework to display fiscal accounts. 
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FISCAL SOCIAL ACCOUNTING MA TRJCES 
Social accounting matrices (SAMs) were originally developed by Nobel Prize winner Sir 
Richard Stone. A SAM may be described as a complete presentation of a society's accounts in a 
matrix form. These matrices are often used to highlight the circular flow of income from production 
through consumption, investment, trade, taxes, and public expenditures within a single region. SA Ms 
have proven to be good instruments to show how income distribution is related to production. 
To reveal the interrelations, accounts for factors of production and institutions are 
disaggregated . It is useful to distinguish accounts for decision makers with distinct objectives, 
instruments and/or constraints (i.e. , different prices). An example of a typical national SAM is 
shown in Appendix II .a. with data on the entire United States for 1987. 
SAMs are usually constructed to describe current cond itions in an economy as an 
information base for policy anal ysis. The construction of social accounting matrices , as a necessary 
complement of a system of national accounts, is explicitly recommended by the United Nations 
(U.N., 1968 and 1993). As noted above, the extent of aggregation may vary according to the 
objectives of the analyst or according to the available data . Pyatt (1995), argues that the United 
Nations should recommend the use of SAMs no matter what structure each country is abl e to use. 
SAMs are constructed for developing, transition and developed countries . Pyatt and Round 
(1985) give examples of SAMs for developing countries. An example that is especially relevant to 
our topic is the work of Pleskovic and Trevino (1985). They apply a SAM framework to analyze 
public sector contribution to economic activity, through state-owned enterprises, in the Mexican 
economy. Recently, construction of SA Ms is being recommended for analys is of transition 
economies. Examples of SAMs for developed countries are Round (1995) for the European 
Community and Kilkenny (1995) for regions of the U.S.A .. 
Even though a SAM is neither an economic model nor a specification of economic behavior, 
it is a first step in the process of economic modeling. One important objective of a SAM is to 
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provide the statistical basis for a plausible model (King, 1985). In fact, general equilibrium models 
require a balanced SAM as the first step in the empirical phase. The construction of a fiscal SAM 
is also the first step in the empirical analysis for this thesis . 
Fundamentals of SAMs 
The basic principle of social accounting is that of double-entry book.keeping. SAMs are 
square: each account is represented by one row and one column, identically labeled . By convention, 
the row entries represent incomings or receipts, and column entries represent outgoings or 
expenditures. This gives the advantage that a transaction between two accounts need be recorded 
onl y once. Each element of the matrix represents a transaction between two different accounts, i.e., 
to i from j . This transaction represents interaction, or aniculation between accounts i and j. 
Because it is a system of accounts, SAM construction follows the same steps that the national 
income and product accounts construction. Aggregate consistency between total outflows and inflows 
must be maintained for each account and overall. Budgetary balance and/or market-clearing 
conditions imply that rows and column sums of each account balance. If consistency at the general 
level is maintained , consistency of sub-accounts can also be verified with a SAM. This suggest 
another advantage of using the SAM framework. Even though different agencies may keep accounts 
in different ways according to internal needs , by using a SAM we can reconcile the potentially 
different reports from the agencies. Also, by presenting the available data in the SAM format (given 
the row= column conditions) rather than in separate tables or accounts, we can also solve for missing 
"data" on interactions between accounts. 
Matrix Structure 
The generic SAM structure can be constructed to display single national accounts , single 
region accounts, o r interdependent regional accounts equally well. Stone (1961), introduced regional 
accounting with SAMs. The fully articulated SAM for multiple regions is structured as a system of 
sub-systems. The within-region transactions appear in diagonal blocks, and the inter-region 
transactions in off-diagonal blocks. Because of the lack of sufficient information, he proposed the 
use of pooled intermediary accounts rather than directly articulated region-region transactions. When 
the regional location of the origin and destination accounts cannot be identified, a "pooled account" 
can be used to collect all inflows and distribute all outflows among regions . Schemes of both types 
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Table 2 Regional SAMs 
a. Interregional SAM 
Re!!ion 1 Region 2 Region 3 Total 
Reg 1 Within 1 From 2 to 1 From 3 to 1 Reg 1 Inflows 
Reg 2 From 1 to 2 Within 2 From 3 to 2 Reg 2 Inflows 
Reg 3 From 1 to 3 From 2 to 3 Within 3 Reg 3 Inflows 
Total Reg 1 Expend. Reg 2 Expend. Reg 3 
Expend. 
b. Multiregional SAM 
Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Pooled Total 
Account 
Reg 1 Within 1 Pool to 1 R 1 Inflows 
Reg 2 Within 2 Pool to 2 R 2 Inflows 
Reg 3 Within 3 Pool to 3 R 3 Inflows 
Pooled from 1 to .. . From 2 to ... From 3 to ... Pool 
Account Inflows 
Total Reg 1 Exp. Reg 2 Exp. Reg 3 Exp. Pool Exp. 
of regional systems are shown in Table 2. 
Each of the interior blocks may be conceived as complete as any matrix at the national level. 
Other examples of regional disaggregation have been constructed by Pyatt and Round (1985), 
for developing countries. One version of SAM for Sri Lanka in 1970, includes: Factors (capital and 
labor), Institutions -current account (households, corporations and government), a Combined Capital 
account, Production activities (six groups of activities), an Indirect Taxes account and Rest of the 
World. A SAM for Iran in 1970, constructed with a very similar structure, shows 12 activities 
separately and a subdivision of Households in rural and two categories of urban. They separate 
capital accounts for households, government, and the Rest of the World. The information for 
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Malaysia, 1970, was also organized in a very similar structure but distinguishing East and West 
Malaysia (Appendix TI.b). Thus, it is a four block SAM that shows, in the top left block, the internal 
transactions in East Malaysia and in the bottom right those for West Malaysia. The off-diagonal 
blocks show the transactions between the two regions . Other examples of regional SAMs are those 
by Kilkenny (1995), for rural-urban regions in USA and Steider and Oosterhaven (1995), for the 
labor market in the northern Provinces of the Netherlands. Round (1995), proposes a schematic form 
of a bi-regional SAM of Europe that may distinguish between countries that are members of the 
European Community and the rest. 
The Government in SAMs 
In the income-product account framework (NIPA) the government is treated as a single final 
demand sector. In almost all previous SAMs, government transactions are summarized in a single 
account. There are some SAMs structures distinguishing between current and capital accounts for 
the government. A SAM for Swaziland, presents one of the most disaggregated Government current 
accounts (Pyatt and Round, 1985). Main revenue sources are shown separately, then combined 
through a pooled account, and distributed across the main expenditure categories. 
The use of detailed government accounts has been broadly discussed since the 1962 
Conference on Regional Accounts (see Hirsch, 1964). It recognized not only the importance of 
detailed government accounts but also that of regional (lower than national) accounts presentation. 
Burkhead summarized how the public sector was treated in regional social accounts (1964). At that 
time, government accounts detailed expenditures across region by central government, but there was 
no adequate accounting of local government activity within regions. In Burkhead's opinion, the 
minimum requirement for this information to be useful in public decision making was that information 
be disaggregated at each local , state and federal government activities by region. Accounts should 
be classified by function and form of government organization, and detailed expenditures and 
revenues by region should be presented. Burkhead suggested municipalities as the best unit of 
regional disaggregation for local government accounts. Since this would mean too much detail in a 
single account, he proposed that subsidiary accounts could also be maintained for a comprehensive 
system of regional accounts. 
There is no doubt that his proposal described a good way to document the public finances of 
federated regions . Since then, the increase in available information (i.e. , expansion of machine 
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readable data), and, the development of S~Ms present us with new possibilities. 
The Fiscal SAM 
In this thesis I propose a SAM that details the government accounts of the U.S . federal 
system. Fiscal flows represented in such a framework will have some ideal features. First, the 
matrix can clearly show whether the allocation of tax revenue for programs is made directly to 
individuals or as pass-through grants. Second, intergovernmental transfers will be distinguished as 
lump-sum or matching, at each level of government. Third , since each county's fiscal flows will be 
documented in the diagonal blocks, tax and spending on programs by county can easily be related to 
characteristics of the county. Also, very consistent capacity and effort measures at the county level 
may be calculated for cross-comparisons. Fourth , the cost of public goods provision in each region 
is documented, and the government spending on goods and services, salaries, and transfers to people 
and industries in the area are revealed. 
Ideally, this social accounting framework can accommodate any number of accounts. This 
feature allows us to present not only 'within', but also 'between' region accounts showing relations 
at the same jurisdictional level. Following original conventions , the 'within' regional transactions 
are arrayed in the diagonal blocks and the 'between' transactions in the off-diagonal. The county 
level accounts are shown in the upper left corner. State and Federal accounts are in the lower rows 
and rightmost columns. 
Structure 
The SAM structure used is simple, and focuses on the objective to highlight patterns of 
government transactions. The product account is divided into 'activities' and 'commodities'. Each 
of these categories is an aggregation of a broad range of items. Here we will distinguish only 
agriculture from other businesses. This bisecting is done because activities represent decision-makers 
whose expenditures exhaust revenues; while commodities are exchanged in markets where supplies 
are exhausted by demands. There is an account for factors of production (labor, land and fixed 
capital) and one for households. Related to each county, we include state and federal government 
accounts. The rest of the country and the world are aggregated into an extraregional transactions 
account. 
This fiscal SAM is not comprehensive, it is a subset of a complete SAM. Many transactions, 
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ignored here, would be presented in a complete SAM. Lacking complete production accounts, the 
within-region activities, commodity market, factor and household accounts do clear in the subset of 
fiscal SA Ms. Also, only net flows of money appear . Thus, tax credits are net out of taxes paid, and 
do not appear as subsidies paid. Also note that no transactions between two units of the same type 
of agent appear because these net out. 
The fiscal SAM documents the tax payments from farmers, businesses, and households in 
each county to each level of government. It also shows expenditures on goods, services, and 
government employment from each level of government by region to location of the seller, or the 
residence of the government employee. This is a transactions-based, rather than a "benefits-based" 
approach. It does not show any regional allocation of the benefits of public goods provision, which 
by definition of external ities elude enumeration. It highlights actual money flows between private 
agents and public entities by location. 
Government Accounts 
Government accounts are first identified by level as Local, State or Federal. These three 
levels of government are distinguished because they have different objectives: to provide public goods 
of differing degrees of spatial excludability and non-rivalness. This also means they have different 
instruments: different agencies and programs across which their funds are to be allocated . Counties 
are chosen as the unit of analysis for local government fiscal accounts . Data on counties and the 
State of Iowa will be used to demonstrate the construction and use of a fiscal SAM. In Iowa, all 
municipalities are fully within county boundaries. For states in which municipalities are not wholly 
contained within counties, a separate "municipality" account may be identified . 
Governments allocate revenues to agencies to conduct programs. Agencies must balance 
their budgets, and programs may be provided by more than one agency . For example, the program 
called "education" is financed by federal , state, and local education agencies : the U.S . Dept. of 
Education, state departments of Education, and local entities called school districts. Notice that in 
the proposed SAM structure, it is not necessary for agency and/or program jurisdictions to be 
coherent with the jurisdiction(s) of the level (s) of the financing governments involved . Government 
and agency spending is pooled into program accounts . 
Program spending is on objects: goods and services, wages and salaries, capitaJ/infrastructure, 
or transfers to persons. As noted above, one critical task is to trace government revenues through 
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program spending back to the local residents. Thus, program spending is pooled into object 
accounts, which are allocated across local areas according to the spatial distribution of the transfer-
recipient population, the residence of government employees, and the location of economic entities 
serving government final demands. The task is to trace the expenditures of each level of government 
through agencies to the resident population in each region. 
This is a unique feature of our fiscal SAM. It shows actual outlays on public employment 
and government purchases of goods and services within the region. Other government accounts 
document spending on programs for the regions, which is clearly not the same as the spending on 
objects in the region. But spending on objects is the pertinent information if we want to measure the 
impact of government as an income-generating activity in a particular area. 
Another unique feature of fiscal SAMs is they distinguish lump-sum from matching grants. 
When a level of government transfers both money and authority over program spending to a lower 
level of government, we should show an intergovernmental transaction, i.e., a flow is recorded to 
the state from the federal government. If only money is transferred , we show direct funding of the 
program by the higher level of government, i.e., a flow is recorded into a program from the federal 
government. For example, traditional social security payments go directly to individuals from the 
federal government. To date, government accounts, agency accounts , and/or program accounts 
presented in the typical T-format (incomings and outgoings) do not allow one to distinguish lump-sum 
grants (expenditures that the lower level of government has some authority to allocate) from direct 
program spending. The method proposed here identifies the level of government that allocates a 
program's expenditure as the level of government (or government agency) which articulates with the 
program account. For example, if local government have all authority over education spending, the 
education program account articulates with only the local government account. 
As long as agencies are uniquely associated with separate levels of government, one can 
"collapse" the agency accounts into their respective governments at each level. This simplification 
further highlights the articulation between governments and programs. An example of an agency 
which cannot be uniquely associated with a level of government is the local school district. School 
district boundaries are rarely contiguous with county or municipality boundaries. School districts 
may have independent tax/spend authorities . Thus, school districts are an agency that is worthwhile 
to distinguish in fiscal SAMs. 
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Treatment of Federal Grants 
From the literature review, it is clear that the distinction between lump-sum and matching 
intergovernmental transfers is an important one. The typical accounting framework cannot do this 
without a lot of "side information." A unique feature of SAMs is that these distinctions can be made 
clear by the articulation of the entry. Table 3 shows schematically how this distinction operates. 
Lump-sum transfers allow the recipients to choose the way in which the revenues are spent. This 
type is represented in the fiscal SAM by a flow from a higher government to a lower government (not 
a program). Categorical grants are tied to particular programs, so are represented by flows from the 
higher levels of government directly to the program. 
While the government-government versus government-program articulation makes clear the 
distinction between lump sum and categorical intergovernmental transfers , it also means that total 
revenues at each level of government (calculated as the sum of row entries) will NOT match total 
revenues reported by state (or local) budget analysts . This is a strength, not a weakness of the 
proposed structure. The fiscal SAM does not merely duplicate existing information (budget balances 
as reported by state auditors), but it adds the critical information distinguishing block grants from 
program spending. 
Although this framework allows one to trace th e circular flow of fiscal revenues, the current 
fonn in which government expenditure data is reported prevents one from constructing the ideal fiscal 
SAM. The available data does not allow one to distinguish block grants from matching grants or 
categorical intergovernmental funds. A very valuable effort in that direction is the AClR document 
about grants-in-aid programs to state and local governments. This document lists programs as under 
block or categorical grants, and also details program names and conditions under each type of funding 
(including approximate matching rates) . It is extremely helpful, but the ACIR information still does 
not identify the amounts of spending by type. Thus, I must treat all intergovernmental funds the 
same, and cannot distinguish which spending comes with federal authority from spending under more 
local authority. 
Intergovernmental funds for AFDC and Title XIX from the federal government to states are 
an example. The state just administers those funds, and has the obligation to match them. We treat 
them as intergovernmental transfers even though this is a typical case were we would show federal 
government allocating funds into the welfare program. Despite the state intermediate activity, the 
power of decision here, under the previous form of welfare programs in U.S.A . was held by the 
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Table 3 Distinguishing Lump Sum from CategoricaJ IntergovernmentaJ Transfers 
a. Lump Sum Articulation: 
TAX- LOCAL STATE FED Total 
PAYER Receipts 
Education '· s. 1.+s. 
Welfare lw s ... lw+Sw 
OtherProgr lo so lo+So 
LOCAL GOV. L B1 B1+L 
STATE GOV. s B, B,+S 
FEDERAL G F 
Total L+S+F 1:;;l;=B1+L E ·S·=B +S I I I B1+B, 
Notes: I· and S· are ocal and states endm on ro rams out ot their res ecttve total revenues. I I pg pg p 
L and S are local and state own revenues. B1 and B, are lump sum transfers to locaJ and state, 
respectively. 
b. CategoricaJ Articulation: 
Tax- LOCAL STATE FED Total 
Payers Receipts 
Education 1. s. f. 1. +s. +f. 
Welfare I,.. s... f.., l..,+s..,+f.., 
Other lo so fo lo +so +fo 
LOCAL GOV. L L 
STATE GOV. s s 
FEDERAL G F 
Total L+S+F L;l;=L E ·S·=S I I E;f; 
Note: I; and S; corres ond to local and states endm on ro rams out o their own reven p p g p g ues, 
and f; represent federaJ categoricaJ spending in each program. Total spending by local and state 
governments in this case must equal their own revenues Land S, respectively. 
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federal government. 
Actually, AFDC and Title XIX are cases in which is possible to have separate estimates. 
However, they are an exception and we cannot show it without breaking the consistency of the 
matrix . 
A Fiscal SAM for Iowa 
We present a sample fiscal SAM for counties of Iowa. Given the available information we 
concentrate on the within county (diagonal) blocks. We cannot document fiscal flows among Iowa 
counties with available data. 
Table 4 presents a schematic SAM labeling the flows that articulate any pair of accounts. 
We will show all revenues collected from tax payers at the local level. The school districts ' portion 
of resources (property tax, education charges, and other) appear as received from the local 
government instead of directly from the taxpayers. This reflects the real way in which property taxes 
work, but also allows us to distinguish the sector of origin for these revenues (see Appendix Ill). 
Revenues coming from higher levels of government as intergovernmental transfers appear in the 
rightmost column accounts. As noted before, we do not show flows between the same level of 
government. Revenues raised by state and federal government from taxes on businesses and 
households appear in the state and federal (lower border) rows. 
The local tax revenues raised within counties plus intergovernmental funds is total local 
government revenues (the row sum). Total revenues are spent by local governments on various 
programs. This spending appears as local government column entries. We disaggregate only 
education from other public goods and services because education spending is under school district 
authority. 
The data on state expenditure by program is onJy available in terms of aggregate spending 
in the State. This data appears in the state column, program rows. The data source does not provide 
for the county distribution of these expenditures . The ultimate county distribution of the state 
spending is traced through the program accounts, then object spending across counties is distributed 
as explained below. Likewise, federal spending is shown as total spending on programs in the federal 
column, program row cells. 
The money spent on the various programs covers salaries, purchases of goods and services, 
and sometimes transfers to different types of agents. The ideal matrix would show this separation 
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for each program at each level of government. 
We are able (due to data limitations) to present just a pooled account for these objects . This 
account presents data for the sum of state and local spending, distinguishing education from other 
public goods and services, and the sum of federal program spending. This pooled account shows the 
money spent within the state. To balance the ' program' account we use the 'net extraregional 
transactions' row that reflects the net flow of government salaries and purchases outside the state. 
Finally, we allocate all government program spending on objects as revenues to farmers, 
businesses, workers, and households in each county; via subsidies, transfers, salaries, and purchases 
of commodities and services. 
Information derived from SAMs 
The fiscal SAM organizes all the available data on government tax receipts , intergovernmental 
transfers, and government expenditures relative to each region . Note that the full fiscal SAM of Iowa 
has 99 blocks and it is too large to be shown in hard copy. With this comprehensive and exhaustive 
set of regional fiscal accounts, we proceed to calculate county level measures of tax burdens and 
fiscal inflows. First, an (im)balance measure with respect to all levels of government is derived 
directly from the data in the matrix. Summing up the revenues collected by the three levels of 
governments from each type of taxpayer in the region measures all revenue raised from each region. 
(Refer to Table 4, the first five cells in the 'Total ' row.) On the spending side, we sum all spending 
on objects within the region . This total represents the contributions by all levels of government to 
the economic activity of the region. (See Table 4, the first five cells in the 'Total Objects' column.) 
The net of these two totals is the final (im)balance in fiscal flows for each region. 
Another indicator that can be calculated using the multi-regional fiscal SAM data (to our 
knowledge, not calculated before at the local level) is the 'fiscal effort index' . This index compares 
the actual revenue collected from local sources (6th. cell in 'Subtotal' column, Table 4) to the 
hypothetical revenue calculated outside the matrix (see the explanation in the literature review under 
'Measuring Fiscal Performance' , and Appendix Ill) . Using the data in the fiscal SAM we can also 
calculate several other measures such as would indicate the proportion of program spending financed 
with state or federal transfers, or determine what type of taxpayer provides more government revenue 
at each level. 
As described in the next chapter, I apply multivariate analysis to the indicators calculated 
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using the data in the county-level matrix along with secondary data about the counties . The objective 
of the multivariate analysis is to identify patterns in fiscal situations associated with locations. The 
resulting groups are analyzed in next chapter. I have constructed a reduced fiscal SAM that 
aggregates the 99 Iowa counties into three regions. The three regions are urban counties, rural 
counties and all other Iowa counties. Appendix IV presents the complete three block matrix . 
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DA TA ANALYSIS 
In the previous chapter I explained the SAM used to organize the data on government revenue 
and expenditures by regions. I also explained how to derive some measures of fiscal balance-
imbalance from these matrices. 
The second objective of this thesis is to analyze the data, looking for patterns of fiscal 
situations that may differ across types of locations . Using the balance-imbalance measure and other 
information about county characteristics, 1 first performed a cluster analysis. Fiscal (im)balance for 
each county is calculated as the net per capita tax revenue to all levels of government from the county 
minus spending by all level of government received within the county. Second, using the groups 
resulting from that first step, I applied a stepwise procedure and discriminant analysis to complete 
the investigation. 
Cluster Analysis 
The basic objective of cluster analysis is to discover natural groupings of items. Cluster 
analysis is often thought of as a primitive technique in that no assumptions are made concerning 
possible group number or structure (Johnson and Wichern, 1992). It is basically an exploratory 
procedure aimed at simplifying complex multivariate relationships. In the widest sense, it is simply 
a method for organizing a large set of data so that information use may be more efficient. Describing 
patterns of similarity and differences among the individuals of a certain population by labeling their 
group is a convenient way to summarize data . 
The objective of cluster analysis is to devise a scheme to sort objects into classes or groups 
so that similar ones are in the same group. The concept of similarity is defined in terms of the 
particular set of variables that is being used. Consequently, the chosen variables determine the frame 
for the clustering structure. The method is completely numerical and it is based on measures of 
similarities or distances (dissimilarities) between objects. Thus, one first important consideration is 
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scaling of measured attributes. In this particular case I have used standardized variables. 
Qustering Techniques 
Many cluster algorithms exist that help to find 'reasonable' clusters without having to search 
for all possible combinations. The most widely used are the agglomerative hierarchic methods that 
start with each object in a group by itself. With this approach we have 99 initial clusters; one for 
each county. Based either in the original data set or in a matrix of distances (e.g. Euclidean, or 
Mahalanobis) the method begins to merge groups that are close together, repeating the procedure 
several times. Eventually, all subgroups are merged into a single cluster, but the analyst may decide 
where to stop. The procedure may be graphically represented by a dendrogram which illustrates the 
fusions made at each step. 
Agglomerative hierarchic methods differ in the way they define 'similarity' or measured 
distance between individuals or groups. Some of these methods are: 
i) Single linka.ge, defines distance between groups as that of the two closest pair of individuals. 
ii) Complete Linkage, measures distance between groups as the distance between the two elements 
that are the farthest. 
iii) Average linka.ge , defines the distance between two groups as the average of distances between all 
pairs of individuals. 
iv) Centroid, measures distance between groups as the distance between the two mean vectors. 
v) Ward 's minimum variance. Formally, the procedure seeks to minimize the 'information loss' 
associated with each grouping. Information loss is defined in terms of error sum-of-squares: 
w = L; Lj (xij - xJ(xu - xJ' , 
where x;. = 1 In; I: ; xij is the ith group mean vector, n; is the size of the ith group and X;i is the vector 
of attributes for the jth unit in the ith group. More intuitively, the procedure tries to minimize 
variance within groups (or maximize variance between groups). This method tends to form spherical 
clusters and groups of similar size. 
Everitt (1993) presents an extensive summary of all advantages and disadvantages that have 
been found for each agglomerative technique. We may say that, among the hierarchical methods, 
Ward's and average linka.ge have been found to perform well. However, in general , no single 
method is 'best' for all situations. It depends always on the type of data, the objectives and the 
previous knowledge of the subject. In particular for our analysis, Ward 's minimum variance seems 
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to be the best. 
One characteristic of hierarchical agglomerative methods is that once two objects have been 
joined they cannot be separated. Since eventually all objects can be aggregated, the investigator 
needs to decide when to stop. In other words, the finaJ number of clusters is decided by the 
investigator not the algorithm. There are severaJ criteria on which the analyst can rely to choose the 
number of clusters but one condition is really relevant: the groups have to be meaningful from the 
point of view of the original objectives. In this thesis : to highlight any possible pattern of fiscal 
situation by type of location. 
Some formal criteria to choose the number of clusters are based on between and within sum 
of squares (Milligan and Cooper, 1985). One of them is the Calinski and Harabasz index (CJ which 
is potentiaJly non-linear and may reach a critical point. It is defined: 
cit = trace(B)/{k-1) 
trace(W)/(n-k) 
where B and W are the between and within cluster sum of squares and cross product matrices, (i.e. 
B = Li 11;<X •. - xJ(i;, - i ..)' where i .. = l/n L iLj X;); k is the number of clusters and n is the total 
number of individuaJs. A C" aJways increasing with k means no cluster structure, always decreasing 
as k increases is a sign of possible hierarchical structure. If Cit rises to a maximum at k" and then 
decreases there are k" clusters. 
A second criterion used to determine the number of groups is the 'Cubic Qustering Criterion ' 
(CCC): 
CCC = Log 1-ECR2) • Cnp/2)112 
1-Rr (.001 + E(R2))t.2 
where R2 is the same as trace(B)/trace(f) , (1-R2) is trace(W)/trace(f), with T = B + W, and p is the 
rank of matrix B. Here the criterion is to stop clustering at the point that the CCC levels off as k 
increases. 
Several other procedures may be used to confirm the results from a clustering. In many cases 
it may be reasonable to apply a number of clustering methods. Similar solutions may be a good sign 
that a particular structure is present. Another useful procedure to test results is to randomJy divide 
data in subgroups and reapply the procedure. In this case, similar results suggest robustness of the 
stability of the solution. Finally, comparison of the clusters found, on the basis of other variables 
of interest is recommended (Everitt, 1993). If differences between clusters persist, it is a good sign 
that by using this structure we are conveying other useful information. 
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Ouster Results 
Our goal is to identify patterns in fiscal situations. We start exploring the clustering power 
of different subsets of variables that include the fiscal (im)balance measure derived from the fiscal 
SAM data. The original set of variables includes the fiscal (im)balance measure and secondary 
information on the characteristics of each region. The characteristics of interest concern the county's 
rural population, farm types, some demographics, unemployment rates , average income, proportions 
of the work fo rce that com.mutes and other variables. Appendix C shows the complete set of 
variables, sample means , and standard deviations. 
Using SAS PROC CLUSTER, I found plausible results for various subsets, in the sense that 
they separate a reasonable number (less than 6) of meaningful groups. At the end I choose to show 
the results for a three-group clustering based on a subset of four variables. The four variables are: 
the per capita revenue minus spending measure of fiscal situation or fiscal balance (REV-SPD), the 
proportion of population living in rural areas (RPOP), proportion of farms with less than 50 acres 
(SF ARM) and proportion of farms with more than 500 acres (LFARM). The inclusion of indicators 
of rural characteristics is motivated by the objective itself. The proportion of rural population is not 
enough. I also hoped to include some indicator of the farming activity in the area. The last two 
variables , rather than the simple number of farms, intends to reflect the type of farming activity that 
dominates. I found that the number of farms was (not surprisingly) positively correlated to less rural 
areas, and this obviously was due to the fact that, given the common size of Iowa counties, more 
means sma.ll er farms. The farming area was not useful as a separation variable for similar reasons. 
I used Ward 's minimum variance method for structuring the groups. Complete linkage was 
also used as a checking procedure, and the final structure was very consistent. To determine the 
number of groups I looked at the Calinsld and Harabasz index (pseudo F in SAS terminology) and 
the Cubic Clustering Criterion . Both of them coincide in a structure of about three groups. 
At this point we must make a note: Ward 's method tends to form spherical clusters with about 
the same number of individuals. Consequently, results are affected by outliers. Moreover, the two 
cut-off criteria cited above are known to perform well when group sizes are similar, which is not the 
case with my county level data. I found one large middle cluster and two smaller ones . Table 5 
shows the sizes of the final groups in terms of population and number of counties. 
Another way to check if the number of clusters is reasonable is to look at the RSQUARE. 
It represents a measure of the variability that is left outside the group. With three groups we have 
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Table 5 Population and Number of Counties by Cluster 
Cluster 
1 2 3 
Population 289639 923825 1563291 
Counties 22 57 20 
almost 50% of the variation outside, wh ich is a reasonable result. 
Group means for the four clustering variables are shown in table 6 . The first group may be 
identified as the 'most rural' , characterized by a large proportion of rural population (87 % average), 
relatively more large farms (25 % LFARM on average against 15% SFARM), which definitely 
receives more spending from the government than it pays in taxes and other charges (REV-SPD is 
negative). 
Table 6 Means by Group (Cluster Variables) 
Cluster 
Variable 
1 2 3 
REV-SPD -1428.82 69.67 520. 15 
RPOP 87.89 62.34 31. 16 
SF ARM 14.83 16.41 24.39 
LFARM 25.42 18.68 15.32 
In the other extreme, there is group 3 that I would denote as ' most urban". This group has 
the smaller proportion of rural population (3 1 % average) and relatively more small farms (24% 
Sf ARM average against 15% LFARM). On average the REV-SPD variable is positive and larger, 
implying that, in these counties, only part of what they pay in taxes returns to the county as 
government expenditures . This is not, however, a uni form characteristic of each county in the group; 
there is a wide variation and some of th e most urban counties pay less taxes than they receive in 
spending. 
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The other group is what may be called an 'intermediate' group: average rural characteristics, 
and a small positive average for the REV-SPD indicator resulting from moderate negative and 
positive individual values. 
Interestingly enough, the resulting groups make sense from the point of view of the traditional 
Beale classification. Beale Code (Figure 6) and Clusters maps for the 99 counties (Figure 7) give 
a first idea of the resemblance. The Beale Code, in a broad sense, classifies counties from 
metropolitan to non-metropolitan in nine steps. The nonmetro are subdivided into urban, less 
urbanized and rural, distinguishing adjacent and nonadjacent with respect to a metropolitan county 
(see Appendix VIII). 
Table 7 Beale Code Composition of Clusters 
Beale Cluster 
Code 
1 2 3 Total in 
Beale Code 
2 1 0 4 5 
3 0 0 5 5 
4 0 0 3 3 
5 0 2 4 6 
6 4 17 3 24 
7 2 33 1 36 
8 3 5 0 8 
9 12 0 0 12 
Total in 22 57 20 99 
Cluster 
Table· 7 presents a crosstabulation of the counties between the three clusters and the original 
Beale code. It is apparent that Cluster 1 groups all rural nonadjacent counties, 3 rural adjacent and 
a few less urbanized. There is one special case included in the rural cluster that is in fact a 
metropolitan county: Pottawattamie. 
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Beale Code 
-- 2-3 --4-5 ~~' 6 - 7 ~~' 8 - 9 
Figure 6 Iowa Counties by Beale Code Classification 
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Clusters 
~-~ 1.Rural ~-~ 2.lnter ••• 3.Urban 
Figure 7 Iowa Counties by Cluster 
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This county is part of the Omaha MSA and is classified as metropolitan . Although the proportion 
of rural population is less than 30% in Pottawattamie, it has one of the largest negative 
revenue/spending observation. This difference comes from lower revenues raised relative to other 
similar counties combined with a larger spending in the county (particularly transfers from the federal 
government). Later, we'll see that this county is reassigned to the intermediate group (with high 
probability) by the discriminant analysis. 
Cluster 2 combines most of the less urbanized counties, five rural adjacent and two urban 
nonadjacent: Lee and Webster. There are no special features about these counties other than a 
proportion of rural population a little over 35% , which stands a little over the urban proportion, and 
almost a tie between revenue generated and spending attracted . 
Cluster 3 is mainly composed of metro and nonmetro-urban counti es . There are 3 less 
urbanized adjacent and 1 less urbanized nonadjacent. As I said before, a few counties classified into 
this group present a negative fiscal balance (i. e., government expenditures larger than revenue), but 
contrary to what may be expected, these are none of the less urbanized . The 4 counties with negative 
balance measure are: Story, Clinton, Walpello and DesMoines . Both Walpello and Clinton county 
have a community college. The largest negative number is for Story county (even larger than the 
other 3 together), where education salari es play an important role. The less urbanized nonadjacent 
county classified in this group is Sioux which has the Northwest Iowa Technical College. Sioux 
county has cons istent indicators of being rural (e.g ., large proportion of rural population, large 
proportion of income coming from farming) , except for a moderate high positive relation 
revenue/spending. AJ so, the proportion of small farms is much bigger than that of large ones (both 
characteristics of cluster 1). 
Two other subsets of variables gave plausible results. The results were very similar to the 
three group solution described, but they produce a four group clustering with a split of the 
intermediate group. I decided for the three group because there was no important difference in the 
conclusions, not much additional information, and the interpretation of some cases was not clear. 
This may not be the ideal cluster structure: other subsets of variables, other procedures or 
cut--0ff methods may provide better descriptions of the resulting groups. I have found, however, that 
the hypothesis that there are differences in fiscal situations related to the type of location appears 
consistent with the data. In fact, the usual tests leads to rejection of the hypothesis of equal means. 
I ran multivariate analysis of variance (MA NOV A) to test the hypothesis of equal mean vectors 
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between the three groups. The results point clearly towards rejection of the null hypothesis 
(Appendix VU). We are aware of the assumptions that MANOVA implies: normality and equal 
variances. We thought that the assumption of normality was not too restrictive since our data does 
not show any particular non-normalities . The assumption of equal variances is a bit more strong, and 
in fact, when we present "discriminant" results it is discussed more carefully. I also looked at the 
Bonferroni t-test for each pair of groups , and analysis of variance (ANOVA) for each variable in 
particular. Both tests supported the conclusion of significant differences between group means. 
Discriminant Analysis 
Discriminant analysis and classification techniques are usually associated because although 
they are aimed at different purposes, their purposes frequently overlap. Discriminant analysis is 
concerned with separating distinct sets of objects. Johnson and Wichern (1992) state the immediate 
goal of 'discrimination' is to describe, either graphically or algebraically, the differential features of 
objects from several known populations. The object of 'classification' is to sort or allocate objects 
(usually new observations) into two or more well defined classes . Discrimination is a procedure to 
find 'discriminants' that make populations as distinct as possible. Classification is about the 
construction of rules that can be used to assign new objects to predefined classes . They are, 
however, strongly connected, and in fact several discriminant procedures give 'good' rules for 
classification and vice-versa. 
In this thesis I emphasize the separation aspect of discriminant analysis as a complement or 
corroboration of the clustering results. Like cluster, discriminant analysis is used here as an 
exploratory procedure. Actually, it is often used on an one-time basis to investigate group differences 
when causality or interrelationships are not apparent. 
Discrimination Techniques 
Discriminant analysis is also a method completely numerical and intends to consider distances 
of individual observations from the population means as well as variability. Formally, these 
populations can be described by probability density functions . For a two population case, 
observations can be assigned to populations by looking at the results of a likelihood ratio of the form: 
L{l)/L(2), where L(i) i= 1,2 is the likelihood function or joint probability density function evaluated 
at the corresponding sample. 
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Depending on the assumptions that the investigator is able to make, the likelihood ratio test 
will generate a quadratic or a linear function. In particular, departures from nonnality affect 
seriously the validity of a quadratic rule but it is less crucial for a linear rule. On the other hand, 
the linear function requires the assumption of homogeneity of variances (i.e., compares distances 
from means), while non homogeneous variances are accommodated with a quadratic function. 
The linear function has proven to be a good rule when the distribution is not normal with 
equal variances. Also, the linear function has the advantages of simplicity and easier interpretation. 
Thus, this rule· is very popular for identifying characteristics of various sub-populations. Linear 
functions are also known as 'Fisher discriminant functions '. The intuition behind Fisher's work is 
easy to understand and especially helpful for separation objectives. Fisher's idea (Johnson and 
Wichern, 1993) was to transform multivariate observations into well-separated univariate 
observations. The discriminant analysis should provide reasonable representations of the populations 
using only a few linear combinations of the original variables. A simple version of the problem is 
to find Z = fl. 'X, where X is the vector of original variables and fl is the vector of coefficients. The 
point is to find the coefficients that maximize distance between groups . This is done by maximizing 
squared distance between sample means of Z over the sample variance of Z . It can be shown that 
the vector of coefficients that most separates the groups is given by the first eigenvector (i.e., the 
eigenvector associated to the largest eigenvalue) of the matrix w·1 • B, where B and W are defined 
as before. In a way, this is consistent with the purpose of maximizing the group separation which 
can be measured by the ratio of 'between' over 'within' variances . 
The usual way of judging the performance of any rule is related to its classification objective. 
Ideally, we could use population density functions to evaluate error rates . Since many population 
parameters appearing in the discriminant functions are likely to be estimated from the sample and 
density functions which are hardly known, I must use some substitute of the ideal procedure. To 
measure the performance independently of parent populations, I can calculate 'error rates ' or 
misclassification probabilities by reapplying the rule to the original observations. There are several 
methods for estimating the sample rule performance. One of these methods is called ' resubstitution' 
or the apparent error rate (APER). The error rate is defined as the fraction of observations in the 
training sample that are misclassified by the sample discriminant function (Johnson and Wichern, 
1993). The APER is calculated from a matrix that combines original and predicted group 
membership . Table 8 is a sample of this matrix for the two population case, where n;i represent 
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Table 8 Misclassification Error 
Predicted 
Origin Pop 1 Pop 2 Total 
Popi nu n12 n. 
Pop2 n21 n72 n2 
number of observations coming from population i classified into population j (i,j = 1,2). 
Then, APER = (n12 + n21)/ (n1 + ni) is recognized as the proportion of items in the original 
sample that are misclassified. 
Another way to estimate error rates consists in setting aside a certain number of observations, 
constructing the rule from the rest, and then using the group set aside to check the results. The 
method known as 'crossvalidation' uses this idea. The basic idea is to randomly separate the sample 
in g groups, then construct the rule from g-1 groups and test it with the elements of the 'i" group. 
Repeat this procedure g times, recording the results each time. Finally, construct a table, like the 
one explained above, using these results and calculate the error rate in the same way. One variation 
of this method is to 'holdout' one element at a time (i.e. groups of one element). This is known as 
Lachenbruch 's procedure. 
All these methods provide biased estimates of the true misclassification rates, unless the 
sample sizes are very large. Crossvalidation provides less biased estimators than resubstitution. 
However, these problems affect classification more than separation because the estimated 
classification rule tends to be better at separating the training samples than distinguishing among the 
underlying populations. 
Finally, as in clustering, there is the problem of which variables to use. Apparent error rates 
from resubstitution will not increase as more variables are included in the classification rule but 
probabilities of misclassifying a new case may increase. In any case, it is desirable to select a 
relatively small subset of variables that ideally contains as much information as the original set. 
To work with linear discriminant functions , the stepwise discriminant analysis is an 
appropriate tool to select a significant subset of variables. The objective of stepwise discriminant 
analysis is to produce a good discrimination model using 'stepwise' selection of variables. The model 
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building process starts with no variables and then tests one at a time to enter the model. After a new 
variable is entered, the preceding variables are checked to see if they are still significant. The 
selection and removal of variables is usually based on an F test (both for entry and removal 
purposes), used by SAS and BMDP packages, but there exist other statistics to perform the test. The 
F test involves an analysis of covariances where the new variable is regressed against the ones already 
in the model . 
The procedure is sensitive to the presence of large correlations among variables or 
combinations of variables. Because the procedure does not account for correlation between variables 
that have not been entered in the model , some important variables may be excluded. However, it 
has proven to be successful in selecting correct variables in a number of cases; in particular, when 
the sample size is less than or equal to 100 (O'Gorman and Woolson, 1991) as in this study. 
Discriminant Results 
The construction of a discriminant rule based on the same subset of variables chosen for 
clustering is usually a first check on the grouping of individual observations. One expects to find 
very few reassignments and small error rates . In our case, the estimated error rates were between 
3% and 4% , according to the method used . 
A further use of discriminant analysis is to consider a larger set of attributes and see bow well 
they discriminate into the predefined clusters. Finding that extra variables behave differently for the 
predefined groups, is one way to be more confident about the chosen clustering and it also help the 
description or characterization of the groups. 
I first applied stepwise discriminant analysis (SAS PROC STEPDISC) to the same original 
set of variables described for clustering, to select a meaningful subset. Four new variables were 
chosen as significant, apart from the four originally used for cluster: fiscal effort index, either relative 
to state (SFEFF) or to the whole U .S.A (NFEFF) , percentage of work-force commuting out 
(COM OUT), percentage of total personal income from farming (F ARMINC), and the local 
unemployment rate (UNEMP) (Appendix D). A significance level of 25% was used, which may be 
considered conservative. The unemployment rate was the less significant variable, it does not 
differentiate among groups very much . 
Then I used discriminant analysis to construct a linear discriminant rule (SAS PROC 
DISCRJM). I used a linear function, even though the homogeneity of variances would be rejected 
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using the standard test (Chi-square test for homogeneity of within group variances). The use of a 
linear function, as I argued before, has the main advantage of direct interpretation of the results. 
Also, the estimated error rate using a quadratic rule (not pooled variance), does not improve much 
the results of a linear rule: 2 % and 8 % from resubstitution and cross validation respective! y. 
Discriminating among the three clusters with a linear function and eight variables performed 
well and resulted in acceptable error rates . The resubstitution method shows an apparent error rate 
of 1 % ( as noted before it decreases as more variables are included), and crossvalidation estimates 
of the probability of misclassification was an overal l 7 % . Even though our final goal is separation 
for descriptive purposes, rather than classification, I choose to show the crossvaJidation results (see 
Table 9) because it provides more information. The SAS printout shows the elements that are 
considered misclass ified individually, and gives the probabilities of belonging to every poss ible group 
(Appendix VI) . 
Table 9 Crossvalidation Summary. 
To Cluster 
From 1 2 3 Tot 
1 18 4 0 22 
2 2 55 0 57 
3 0 1 19 20 
Tot 20 60 19 99 
otal Error estimate: 7 3 4 + 2 + 1 ( 'JI) = .0707 ) 
Most of the changes would be between groups l and 2. There is one county going from the 
most urban to the intermediate group, but the probability of being in either group is very close to 
503. There is one change worth mentioning: Pottawattamie is moved from group I to 2, with 
probability larger than 803 . 
The three group structure is thus supported by the eight variable discriminant analysis . 
Characterization of clusters may be completed by referring to the group behavior of the new 
variables. Table 10 presents the group means for the eight discriminant variables. As mentioned 
earlier, unemployment rate does not account for much variability itself, so comments are restricted 
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Table 10 Means by Cluster (Discriminant Variables) 
Cluster 
Variable 
1 2 3 
REV-SPD -1428.82 69.67 520. 15 
RPOP 87.89 62.34 31.17 
SF ARM 14.83 16.41 24.39 
LFARM 25.42 18.68 15.32 
SFEFF 101.23 119.30 112.60 
COM OUT 28.23 21.53 17.54 
FARMINC 7.03 6.95 2.06 
UNEMP 2.35 2.51 2.47 
to three of these new variables. 
Cluster 1, identified as the most rural with a large government expenditure relative to revenue 
raised, is characterized by a higher proportion of farm income (FARMINC 7 .03% on average). This 
group is also distinguished by the lowest fiscal effort indexes (SFEFF is 101.23% on average) , and 
the highest percentages of out-commuting (average COMOUT is 28.23%). Even though 
discriminant analysis results suggest changing Pottawattamie from this group to the intermediate 
group, more than 40 % of its labor force commute outside the county, and probably outside the state 
(i.e. Omaha) , since it also has one of the largest proportions of workers in the service area (near 
60%). Fiscal effort indexes for this county are also moderate (about 101 %). 
Cluster 2, the intermediate group, displays much more variation in income generated on 
farms , even though the group average is very similar to that of the first group. The proportion of 
work-force commuting out is lower than in group 1 and has a larger variation . Finally, this is the 
group with highest relative level of fiscal effort. 
Cluster 3, the most urban, shows very small proportion of income coming from farming , 
except for Sioux county which is maintained by discriminant analysis as part of this cluster. The 
proportion of out-commuting is the lowest with the exceptions of Dallas and Warren counties, both 
adjacent to Polk county. Fiscal effort indexes are average relative to the state. 
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MANOVA tests for comparison between mean vectors were also used here (Appendix VII). 
Again the results support the alternative hypothesis of significant differences between the 3 groups. 
The ANOVA results are, in general, consistent except for the 'unemployment' variable where it is 
not possible to reject the equality hypothesis, and that of 'fiscal effort' where the result is on the 
borderline. This should not be any trouble. First, we are working with multivariate analysis and 
ANOV A is just testing isolated variables. Second, we already notice the unclear behavior of 
'unemployment' and pointed out that it was the variable that contributed the least to the 
discrimination. 
Three-Region Fiscal SAM 
The three-block SAM constructed with this clustering (Appendix IV) provides some 
interesting details . Individuals are the most significant source of revenue in any type of region and 
at any level of government. More than 50% of total burden in each region (table 11) comes from 
households (e.g.: individual income and property taxes), and another 20% are from social security 
contributions. 
Table 11 Share of Total Burden by Group and Cluster (% ). 
Group 
Cluster 
Ag Bus in Factor H-H 
1 6 18 20 55 
2 6 20 18 56 
3 1 27 20 52 
Focusing on local revenues, I should note that the farm sector bears almost 30% of the 
burden. In contrast, in the most urban counties, the farm sector bears only about 5% of local taxes 
raised. About 20% of the total tax burden is levied by local governments (mostly property taxes), 
and more than 50% by the federal government. 
The pattern of dependence on intergovernmental transfers shows some group differences 
(table 12). Approximately 36% of spending on programs (excluding education) in rural counties is 
supported by transfers, while for the most urban group, state and federal transfers account for about 
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Table 12 Revenue by Source and Cluster(%) 
Source 
Cluster 
Own Intergov 
Source Transfer 
1 64 36 
2 70 30 
3 77 23 
23 % of their resources. 
From the point of view of income-generating government spending, group differences are 
more striking (table 13). The three groups identified show differences in patterns of expenditures on 
objects earned as revenue in each type of county. Most of government spending is on transfers for 
any cluster. For counties in the most rural group, transfers account for a much large proportion 
(68 % ) of the total spending, compared to the other two types of regions . Individuals are the primary 
target of transfers in all regions, but I should note that transfers to the farm sector explain almost 
30% of the transfers received in the most rural group, against 10% in the most urban one. Object 
spending coming into the most urban group is distributed more evenly between purchases of goods 
and services, salaries and transfers. 
Table 13 Expenditures by Object and Cluster(%). 
Object 
Cluster 
Purchases Salaries Transfers 
I 10 22 68 
2 14 27 59 
3 26 32 47 
In summary, there is evidence to support the hypothesis of different fiscal 'behavior' by type 
of location. There are two well differentiated groups: one group includes the most rural counties (in 
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the traditional sense) with larger government spending levels relative to revenue, explained by the 
high proportion of transfers, in particular to the farm sector. This cluster also displays lower fiscal 
effort and a higher proportion of grants from state and federal government. A considerable part of 
their work-force commutes out. The second group includes the most urban counties where revenue 
raised from county businesses and residents exceeds government spending received as income by the 
cited agents . These urban counties also display average fiscal effort indexes and a large part of work-
force is resident. Almost 803 of the government spending in the area (other than education) is 
financed by own sources. Object composition of government spending in the urban area is 
homogeneous. 
Finally, a third and the largest group of counties includes some rural and urban features . 
These counties maintain only smal l fiscal imbalances, have an intermediate proportion of their work-
force commuting out, and make the largest fiscal efforts. 
Figure 8 plots the revenue/spending balance against the proportion of rural population. 
Figure 9 plots the revenue/spending balance against the fiscal effort index; and Figure 10 plots again 
the revenue-spending results against the proportion of work-force commuting out. Even though some 
overlapping occurs we can appreciate the differences between the three groups. In particular, the 
cluster of most rural counties appears quite well defined by lower taxes than government spending, 
lower fiscal effort, and a larger proportion of out-commuters. 
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Cluster Results 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Under the system of jiscalfederalism in the United States, local governments have depended 
on intergovernmental transfers for about 403 of their total revenues , and states have depended on 
intergovernmental transfers from the federal level for about 203 of their total revenues (Mills and 
Hamilton, 1995). The higher levels of government have pooled taxes from individuals and businesses 
across locations and have provided intergovernmental transfers to distribute public goods and services 
more evenly across the country. Recent proposals to give states more authority over public good 
provision may significantly alter this redistributive mechanism. The form and level of 
intergovernmental transfers to local levels, as well as local tax and spending authorities, are also 
expected to change. What differential effects might these changes have on rural versus urban 
communities? 
This thesis concerns the vertical and horizontal fiscal relationships between governments and 
localities. One set of vertical relationships is tax collection by federal , state, and local authorities 
from economic entities and households in each location. Another set of vertical relationships is 
government spending on programs, on transfer payments or salaries to households, and on purchases 
of goods and services from economic entities, in each location. The differences between rural and 
urban locations in these taxing and spending patterns are the main horizontal relationships of interest 
in this thesis . Other horizontal relationships investigated include the allocation of government 
expenditures across objects, and the distribution of tax burdens across economic agents within 
locations. I organized data on fiscal flows to and from the ninety-nine counties of the State of Iowa 
to empirically investigate potentially significant differences between rural and urban areas in these 
vertical and horizontal relationships. 
From a review of the public finance literature, it is clear that the Tiebout Hypothesis is the 
basis of most models of taxes and public good provision. In sum, the Tiebout Hypothesis is that 
citizens migrate to jurisdictions that offer the tax/public good package they prefer, given their 
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constraints. For empirical analyses such as forecasting local government expenditure, citizen 
preferences and constraints are instrumented by local socio-economic characteristics such as income, 
ethnicity, employment status, levels of urbanization, and land area. These models fit the data 
reasonably well and encourage one to seek further evidence against a null hypothesis that rural and 
urban fiscal patterns are alike. 
Unfortunately, the available data on taxing and government spending are not presented in a 
way that facilitates this kind of vertical and horizontal comparison. An analyst can easily obtain data 
on federal taxing and spending, or, state taxing and spending, by location. But there is no 
presentation of the complete set of data on all taxes paid from a location to all levels of government 
that is reconciled with all spending allocated by all levels of government, by local areas. Thus, the 
first task of this thesis was to design and to construct such a comprehensive set of fiscal accounts. 
The fiscal social accounting matrix (fiscal SAM) shows who pays what taxes to whom and 
how this revenue is spent. The multijurisdictionalfiscal SAM presents local, state and federal flows 
simultaneously. Furthermore, the multi-regional, multi-jurisdictional fiscal SAM presents the same 
data across local jurisdictions simultaneously to facilitate interregional comparisons. Finally, the 
accounting and balance conventions of social account construction guarantee that local fiscal account 
data is comprehensive and fully reconciled . 
The fiscal SAM developed in the previous chapters shows who pays what to whom since 
revenue collected by each level of government is shown by type of taxpayer. In the matrix, payments 
from each agent type (i.e., farm business , other business, factors of production, or households) to 
each level of government (local , state and federal) are distinguished since the fiscal transactions of 
each type of agent are recorded in distinct row/column account entries. The fiscal SAM matrix also 
helps highlight how money is allocated by each level of government across programs or as 
intergovernmental transfers. 
In particular, the proposed fiscal SAM structure hypothetically differentiates 
intergovernmental grants by type: lump sum, block, matching, or categorical (if there were data to 
distinguish government program spending according to type). It is proposed that the concept 
' intergovernmental transfer' should be used to refer specifically to lump-sum or block granting, to 
distinguish such spending from categorical or matching grants. These distinctions could be made 
obvious in the proposed fiscal SAM. Matching or categorical would be recorded as an expenditure 
from higher levels of government directly into programs. This direct articulation would signjfy that 
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the higher level of government has authority over the way the program funds are to be spent. Lump-
sum transfers would be recorded as expenditures from higher levels of government to lower levels 
of government. The Jack of program articulation would signify the lack of higher level authority over 
how the intergovernmental transfers would be spent. 
Moreover, the fiscal SAM developed in this thesis carefully traces actual government 
spending to locations. The fiscal SAM distinguishes government program accounts that pool local 
tax revenues and intergovernmental transfers to finance the provision of the public good or service. 
This fiscal SAM innovation also facilitates accounting for programs which are jointly administered 
by jurisdictions that are not necessarily vertically coherent across space. For example, education 
spending is administered through school districts whose boundaries are not necessarily contiguous 
with county or municipality boundaries. 
Given revenues for government programs, program spending is on objects: goods and 
services, salaries and wages, and transfers to industries and people. In the multi-regional.fiscal SAM, 
object spending is carefully allocated across local areas according to side information about the 
location of economic activity by industry, the locations of transfer recipients , and the residential 
locations of government employees across space. The traditional approach is to measure burdens by 
counting taxes paid from, and to measure benefits by counting program expenditures targeted to, the 
community. The traditional approach does a very poor job of accounting for the effects of 
government spending on local area income, since neither goods/services nor government employees 
are all supplied by the region for which they are demanded . This confounding of cost-priced local 
benefits with government spending flowing to localities can lead to serious errors in fiscal impact 
modelling, since total government expenditure accounts for over 403 of U.S. GNP. 
In sum, the multi-regional, multi-jurisdictional.fiscal SAM approach to government accounts 
guarantees that the data on local fiscal flows is comprehensive and consistent, especially across 
jurisdictions. Constructing the fiscal SAM is thus an important first step before attempting to 
compare fiscal situations of one location with another. I used the latest data (unpublished/unreleased) 
provided on tape exclusively for this thesis from the U.S. Census of Governments to create county-
level fiscal SAMs for each of the ninety-nine counties in Iowa for the year 1992. In the next step 
I investigated whether fiscal patterns varied by type of location. 
First, I applied cluster techniques to group the ninety-nine counties by type. The cluster 
variables included data reflecting ruralness (proportion of population residing in towns of less than 
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2,000) , fanning characteristics, fiscal (im)balance, unemployment rates, demographics, and the 
proportions of out-commuters. The results of both cluster and discriminant analysis of the Iowa 
county data indicated that a three group structure was robust. This objective analysis showed Iowa 
counties can be classified as Rural , intermediate, or Urban types. 
Next I compared fiscal characteristics across the cluster groups. From the review of the 
literature, three ways to measure equity were identified. First was horizontal equity (equal treatment 
of equals); second was vertical equity (tax according to ability, benefits according to need), and a 
third referred to benefits going to those who bear the burdens. Measures of fiscal capacity and.fiscal 
effort were also described. How do these fiscal measures vary across Iowa counties by cluster type? 
Do farmers bear a disproportionate tax burden through the property taxes they pay? Do urban areas 
depend disproportionately on intergovernmental transfers financed by taxes from other areas? Are 
counties whose residents commute out to work different, fiscally , than other counties? 
Iowa is a fiscally responsible state, on average. It 's counties are more self-sufficient than the 
average U.S. county. The rural counties receive 363 of the total revenues from intergovernmental 
sources, compared to the U.S. average of 403. OnJy 23 3 of the total revenue for Iowa's urban 
counties comes through intergovernmental flows. Furthermore, Iowa's.fiscal effort is above average 
compared to the other 49 states (ACIR). 
From the cluster and discriminant analysis it is clear that Iowa's rural counties enjoy a larger 
government expenditure inflow than they bear tax burden. Counties with the most rural 
characteristics, and in particular, more larger farms , attract more government spending compared to 
the revenue they generate. It is true that farm property taxes are an important part of the local fiscal 
burden, but it is also true that federal transfers to agriculture are a significant part of the fiscal 
inflows into the localities. When all government fiscal flows are considered , we cannot say that 
farmers bear a disproportionate burden. As federal spending on transfers to farmers changes under 
the new farm bill of 1996 ("Freedom to Farm"), however, this surplus of fiscal inflows over outflows 
may dis appear. 
In contrast, the most urbanized counties relied the least on intergovernmental transfers (23 3 
compared to rural 's 363) and were the most self-sufficient. The most urbanized counties also bear 
a larger tax burden compared to the government spending they receive as income. Per capita, urban 
residents generated over $500 more tax revenue, on average, than was earned in urban counties 
through government expenditures. Households in urban (as well as all other areas), bear well over 
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half the total tax burden in the form of personal income taxes. Non-farm urban businesses bear the 
local tax burden, and the largest component of local government revenues is property taxes. The 
proposition that Iowa's urban areas receive a disproportionately larger benefit (per capita) from 
government is not supported by these analyses . 
Counties of the intermediate type display relatively balanced tax outflows/fiscal inflows. 
They also displayed the highest level of fiscal effort among the three types of counties in Iowa. The 
property tax burdens are more evenly shared by farm and non-farm businesses, and object spending 
into these counties includes less on transfers to farmers . There is no evidence that urban communities 
in Iowa are being subsidized by the other types of communities. 
The discriminant analysis also showed that county fiscal situations differed according to the 
proportion of out-commuters relative to the resident labor force. Over 28% of the labor force 
residing in the most rural counties commutes out (on average); and these counties paid over $1,400 
less per capita in taxes than they received through government spending. Over 21 3 of the 
intermediate type county labor force commutes out (on average); and these counties generated about 
the same amount of tax revenue as they received through government spending. 
In sum, the cluster and discriminant analysis of the multi-regional, multi-jurisdiction fiscal 
SAM data on Iowa counties provides some evidence against the hypothesis that Iowa farmers bear 
disproportionate tax burdens, and against the hypothesis that urban areas are more dependent upon 
federal transfers than other areas. Such results would likely not be revealed if traditional fiscal 
accounting approaches were employed. According to the traditional approach, government 
expenditures are reported across programs, across objects by category, and across locations for direct 
transfers to persons. But there is no comprehensive account of all government spending (not just 
transfers to persons) across supplying locations of goods, services, or government employees. The 
allocation of program spending across locations is traditionally estimated according to population 
shares . This is obviously not appropriate for allocating, for example, federal military spending; and 
there is no reason to presume that the traditional way would be appropriate for tracing any 
government spending or wage/salary payments . The fiscal SAM approach developed in this thesis 
is a methodological improvement. 
Finally , some topics for further work emerge clearly. First, we need more and better data. 
We would like detail about the nature of federal grants to state and local governments to be able to 
analyze how changes in the form of intergovernmental transfers may affect local area fiscal 
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(im)balances. We also need data on local-local fiscal interrelations before we can present a complete 
picture of the horizontal fiscal relationships among jurisdictions. Second, we would like to analyze 
the fiscal SAM data in other ways, calculating, for example, more detailed measures to investigate 
vertical equity . We would like to conduct SAM multiplier analyses using fiscal SAMs with 
intergovernmental transfers correctly and fully distinguished by type (block vs. categorical). Third, 
other multivariate statistical analyses should be conducted to better understand the relationships 
between local area characteristics and local area fiscal situations. One could estimate multinomial 
probit models of fiscal (im)balance as related to jurisdictional characteristics. 
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APPENDIX I: THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTS 
Local and special State Federal Total 
districts 
Region Rest of Total Region Rest Total Region Rest of Total ~eg1on Rest of Total 
world of World world 
World 
I. General Government 
Current Account 
A . Expenditure 
1 . Nauonal Security 
2. Public Safety 
3. Highways 
4 . Education 
5. Public Welfare 
6. Health and hosp. 
7. Other 
Total 
B. Revenue 
1 . Income Texes 
2. General sales Taxes 
3. Property taxes 
4 . Other 
l otal 
C. Surplus or deficit 
current account 
(A - B.) 
II. General Government 
Capital Account 
A . Expenditure 
1 . National security 
2. Public Safety 
3. Highways 
4. Education 
5. Public Welfare 
6. Health and hosp1tel s 
7. Other 
B. Revenue 
1. Borrowing 
2. Other 
C. Surplus or def1c1t 
capital account 
(A - B) 
Ill. Public Enterprise 
Current Account 
A . Expenditure 
1. Wages and salaries 
2. Other goods and serv. 
3 . Other 
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Total 
B. Revenue 
1. Sales of goods and serv. 
2 . Other 
Total 
C. Surplus or deficit 
on current account 
(A - Bl 
IV. Public Enterprise 
Capital Account 
A . Expenditure 
1 . Buildings and other 
construction 
2. Mac hinery and 
equipment 
3. Other 
Total :expenditures 
B. Revenue 
1. Daprac1atton 
allowances 
2. Other 
Total 
C. Surplus or deficit on 
capital account 
(A - B) 
V. Trust Fund Current 
Account 
A. Expenditure 
1. Administrative 
expanses 
2. Transfers or pay-
ments to 
beneficiaries 
Total 
B. Revenue 
1 . Employer taxes 
2. Employee taxes 
3. Interest 
Total 
C. Surplus or deficit on 
current account 
(A - B) 
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APPENDrx m: SAM DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 
I) Sources 
Local and State Governments 
The main source for local and state revenues and expenditures is the 1992 Census of 
Government (CG92) Finance Statistics, Individual Unit Records (file 92GOVFIN1). The totals were 
always checked with the information from Government Finances 1991 -92 (U.S. Department of 
Commerce,Bureau of the Census, 1995) table 29: State and Local Government Revenue and 
Expenditure by Level and Type of Government, by State. 
1) Local governments 
i) Revenues 
First, a total of property taxes collected by county was constructed from CG92. There is data 
directly for the taxes collected by local governments not including schools . We used that structure 
to distribute the total collected by schools . We think that the underlying property structure may be 
reflected in this way. The common approximations have been to use enrollment or location of the 
headquarter of school districts . There is no total agreement on any. Second, property taxes by county 
from CG92 were distributed by category: residential, commercial and industrial , agriculture, and 
other, using the 1991 proportion from IA Government Finances and Trends (1992), Table 38, 
(primary source: IA Department of Management). Finally, revenues collection from each of these 
categories were assigned to its respective sector: households, other businesses and agriculture. 
All other resources were taken as given in the CG92 tables. Education charges were 
distributed by county enrollment . 
ii) Expenditures 
Expenditures by programs were taken directly from CG92 tables. 
2) State government. 
i) Revenues 
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Total revenues are also from CG92 and Gov. Finances. The distribution by county origin is 
done with the structure of income (1990) and sales (1991) from IA Government Finances and Trends 
(1992), table 44. For corporation income taxes distribution we assumed previous report year (1985-
88) share for agriculture and business in the state totals. For the distribution by county of the state 
collection of agricultural corporation taxes paid, we used the proportion of 'farm income county' in 
'farm income total' (in the state) from the BEA data on Personal Income by Major Source, (CA5) 
code 012. 
ii) Expenditures 
All the information is from CG92 and Government Finances. 
Finally, the composition of state and local expenditures in terms of salaries and purchases of 
goods and services is derived from directly from the Government Finances. Transfers to people are 
estimated from percentages of matching funds for the main welfare programs: AFDC and Title XIX. 
Transfers to business represent state aid to other business. The information came from Iowa 
Department of Economic Development. 
Federal Government. 
i) Revenues 
Taxes paid to federal government by type of taxpayer. All data came from Government 
Finances, table 4: Summary of Federal Government Finances; and Personal Income by Major source 
and Earnings by major Industry, CAS; BEA. 
Corporation Income taxes were allocated between agriculture and other businesses using the 
shares estimated as in state above. The distribution by county was based on proportion of 'non-farm 
income' in total income in each county, line code 082 in the BEA data. 
Individual Income taxes were distributed using the county proportion of total of 'earnings + 
dividends + rents + interest, ' codes 045 and 046. 
Total Sales taxes were disaggregated using the proportion for the county income in total 
income, code 010, and assigned to other businesses. 
Sales of agricultural Products were disaggregated across counties according to the county 
'farm income' proportion, code 012. 
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Contributions to social security were apportioned into counties by taking 11 % of 'residential 
earnings', code 045. 
ii)Expenditures 
All data on expenditures came from the Consolidated Federal Funds Report (CFFR, vol.1): 
Federal Government Expenditures or Obligations by State and County Area; and Federal 
Expenditures by State, various tables . Data is for fiscal year 1992. Total federal spending into 
programs is the total spending in the state of Iowa except for the grants to local and state 
governments. There is no separation of this total by programs. Using CFFR and Expenditure by state 
we were able to separate the three object categories: salaries, purchases and transfers. All are direct 
from the publication except for the fact that transfers were included in "other payments" category that 
we apportioned to agriculture or other businesses using the detail at state level from Expenditures by 
state. In general, CFFR provides county structure for obligations, which is assumed valid for true 
spending. Expenditures by state provides the true outgoing of funds. 
Intergovernmental Funds 
Intergovernmental flows were taken from CG92 and checked with Government Finances, 
CFFR and Federal Expenditures by state. Intergovernmental transfers from federal government to 
state and local governments are shown as one number. We were not able to distinguish block from 
categorical grants by programs at the county level. 
11) County Distribution Methodology 
I) Expenditures on Goods and Services. 
The object is to allocate local and state government purchases by county of origin. The data 
is available in this form for federal purchases directly from CFFR. We assume that each county sends 
its payments for goods and services to a pooled account and so does the state. There is data for the 
total of local and state government expenditures for fiscal year 1992. Then, we want to know how 
this amount enters the flow of funds of each county. (This is related especially to the industry 
structure and working population in each specific county). For the construction of the 99 coefficients 
to be used to calculate the distribution of that total, we use three sources of data. First we use the 
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B.E.A. RPC's for Iowa by commodities. The classification uses an aggregation of the I-0 industry 
classification (or its correspondent SIC) to 127 groups of commodities. With this we can get what 
part of the total government purchases goes into the state of Iowa (IA). Second, also from B.E.A.-
REIS, we use the earnings (labor compensation) by place of work and by activity for the 99 counties. 
The classification has the same base as above but aggregated into 95 categories- some of which are 
just subtotals. In order to apportion the RPC's to the county level , we take the county proportion of 
the total IA earnings by activity to represent the contribution of each county to the value added in that 
activity. Third, we use the government final demand composition by commodity to be able to apply 
the coefficients by county and commodity-activity. The information came from B.E.A., I-0 Accounts 
of the U.S. Economy, 1987 Benchmark; commodity composition of NIPA Final Demand; table C. 
This information uses an 85 group commodity classification of the state and local government 
purchases, distinguishing education from the rest of the programs. This is for the total U.S. economy 
and may embrace some differences but there is no such a detail of data at any regional level. 
Since the classification detail used by the RPC's and the final demand composition were much 
closer between them than with the earnings classification, we proceed to combine those two first , in 
order to avoid larger errors. This may be seen as a coefficient that represent the government 
purchases of each commodity or group of commodities inside lA. 
Then we make the classification here and in the county earnings compatible. This implied 
regrouping in both of them. All the regrouping follow strictly the SIC classification detail. 
To sum up earnings to make new categories is perfectly fine, but we know that just average the 
RPC's is not the best. (The best would be to have more detailed classification of the gross product 
and weight each RPC by the corresponding proportion on the state gross product.) The situations in 
which we had to average (and the RPC's show some differences) are not of major relevance for the 
government purchases, therefore, the classification seemed appropriate. (Note that most relevant 
distortion occurs when pooling "food and kindred" for education purchases). 
Finally the two structures were combined, always maintaining the separation between 
education and rest of the government (except utilities that should be considered into the private 
sector). This final coefficient tells what part of the government purchases of each commodity goes 
into each county. 
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2) Employment Compensation. 
ln this case we want to allocate the amount of salaries and wages paid by government at any 
of the three levels (federal, state and local) into counties of residence. We will assume, as in the case 
of goods and services, that the local governments make payments into an IA pooled account. Again 
we are interested in showing how the government spending enters the economic flow of each county 
area, and this depends first on where people live. First, we need to note here that working with the 
salaries and wages paid by federal , state and local government in IA has the problem of the interstate 
work-migration. We do not have any data on people working for government coming from outside 
the state, but because of the private workers pattern we expect the distortion not to be very large in 
the aggregate. 
Here we will use the data on employment by place of residence by broad activity categories 
from the Population Census 1989-90. We will maintain the distinction between education and rest of 
government. Education employment is all together {private services and public system), but the 
private education services are irrelevant in the total (compare number from IA Department of 
Employment or $ from BEA at the State level); so we work with the total amount of employees in 
education. (The estimates that this number gives is totally compatible with other sources at the total: 
Iowa Department of Employment Services , Employment Retirement System publication of Census 
of Governments 1992 (CG92), V4 (6), i.e.: active membership.) 
We did a two way estimation of the flow of salaries into each county so to double check. 
First, just taking the proportion of each county in the total IA government employment, apportion 
the data on total payments by the government in IA. Second, take the proportion of government 
employment in the employment of each county, always by place of residence. Update it with data 
from lA Department of Employment Services by county and get a number of employees in 
government in each county. Using an average salary for 1992 in government activity get the earnings 
from government employment by place of residence. The average salary is 1987 Census of 
Governments (CG87) data updated by inflation. 
III) Fiscal Effort Index Methodology 
We apply ACIR methodology at county level. The actual collection of revenues comes 
directly from the matrix . The theoretic capacity is calculated in two ways, leading to two indexes. 
One, relative to the national average capacity, is calculated by applying the same national 
74 
representative rate, by type of tax or revenue source, that ACIR uses. A second one, relative to the 
state capacity, is constructed using a state average rate that is calculated following ACIR methodology 
(i.e. total collection over taxable base). 
The only resources considered are Property taxes and Charges, which are the two principal 
sources of income for local governments. For property taxes the average rates by type of property 
(ACIR, 1991) are applied to the property base in each county. Total property base, at market values, 
estimated by ACIR for the state is distributed by county using the county structure of actual assessed 
values from CG92. The main difference in assessed values from market values is the rollback 
percentage applied to residential property . 
For Charges, the estimated capacity at state level (ACIR, 1991) is distributed by population. 
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JVb: Ba]ance-Jmbalance and Fiscal Effort Measures 
Fiscal Fiscal Per Cap 
Effort Effort Gov't 
FIPS COUNTY Index Index Rev-Spe 
Code Name (N) ( s) (dol.) 
State 118 113 137 
19001 Adair 115 99 -522 
19003 Adams 97 86 -922 
19005 Allamakee 110 103 -71 
19007 Appanoose 101 100 -1291 
19009 Audubon 144 123 -250 
19011 Benton 96 89 322 
19013 Black Hawk 148 149 501 
19015 Boone 145 138 -1060 
19017 Bremer 126 124 587 
19019 Buchanan 117 107 253 
19021 Buena Vista 123 113 159 
19023 Butler 96 86 -503 
19025 Calhoun 93 79 -1260 
19027 Carroll 150 139 1298 
19029 Cass 167 154 -365 
19031 Cedar 89 82 436 
19033 Cerro Gordo 90 87 712 
19035 Cherokee 90 BO -181 
19037 Chickasaw 99 90 22 
19039 Clarke 161 154 - 259 
19041 Clay 166 150 812 
19043 Clayton 100 93 -655 
19045 Clinton 97 93 -104 
19047 Crawford 142 127 49 
19049 Dallas 115 113 1094 
19051 Davis 221 208 -142 
19053 Decatur 165 154 -3011 
19055 Delaware 141 131 1138 
19057 Des Moines 102 100 -448 
19059 Dickinson 96 99 1024 
19061 Dubuque 96 97 1178 
19063 Emmet 101 89 -1537 
19065 Fayette 154 138 -342 
19067 Floyd 143 132 -94 
19069 Franklin 151 130 -183 
19071 Fremont 83 71 -1040 
19073 Greene 168 140 -168 
19075 Grundy 125 110 661 
19077 Guthrie 121 111 -628 
19079 Hamilton 156 140 1191 
19081 Hancock 107 93 236 
19083 Hardin 156 141 -227 
19085 Harrison 122 110 -1046 
19087 Henry 144 135 526 
19089 Howard 163 144 -90 
19091 Humboldt 135 118 -369 
19093 Ida 94 81 -182 
19095 Iowa 91 83 1144 
19097 Jackson 134 129 -358 
19099 Jasper 144 139 1735 
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19101 Jefferson 137 132 432 
19103 Johnson 89 89 188 
19105 Jones 87 81 -432 
19107 Keokuk 102 89 -1296 
19109 Kossuth 117 98 -201 
19111 Lee 113 110 389 
19113 Linn 103 104 573 
19115 Louisa 94 86 2175 
19117 Lucas 166 160 -192 
19119 Lyon 82 71 523 
19121 Madison 126 121 49 
19123 Mahaska 135 129 268 
19125 Marion 90 90 238 
19127 Marshall 114 110 867 
19129 Mills 80 75 -3808 
19131 Mitchell 131 118 568 
19133 Monona 104 91 -1890 
19135 Monroe 130 122 -1198 
19137 Montgomery 176 164 -so 
19139 Muscatine 126 123 1921 
19141 O'Brien 121 106 140 
19143 Osceola 90 76 -420 
19145 Page 127 120 -546 
19147 Palo Alto 143 121 -950 
19149 Plymouth 115 106 1030 
19151 Pocahontas 92 75 -762 
19153 Polk 123 122 717 
19155 Pottawattamie 102 101 -3119 
19157 Poweshiek 90 85 -641 
19159 Ringgold 184 165 -1630 
19161 Sac 96 84 -486 
19163 Scott 101 101 626 
19165 Shelby 154 136 427 
19167 Sioux 134 124 552 
19169 Story 172 170 -1120 
19171 Tama 100 88 -726 
19173 Taylor 107 96 -2381 
19175 Union 2 12 201 -755 
19177 Van Buren 166 151 -1192 
19179 Wapello 116 115 -366 
19181 Warren 83 86 388 
19183 Washington 130 122 589 
19185 Wayne 142 1 28 -2215 
19187 Webster 107 100 68 
19189 Winnebago 126 115 252 
19191 Winneshiek 135 128 -1126 
19193 Woodbury 118 116 564 
19195 Worth 95 83 -831 
19197 Wright 130 114 -41 
Source: Own calculations based on ACIR methodology. 
NOTE: ( N) relative to national average rates. 
(S) relative to state average rates. 
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APPENDIX V: SAMPLE STATISTICS 
Variable Label 
X4 
X9 
Xl2 
Xl3 
Xl4 
XlS 
Xl6 
Xl7 
X20 
X23 
X24 
X25 
X26 
X27 
X28 
X29 
X30 
X31 
X32 
X33 
rev-spending per capita 
pop urb total 
pop rural total 
enrolled 
age 65 + 
unemployment 
income per capita 
\ HH income lees than 12500 
\ HH income 50000 + 
farms number 
farms lees than SO acres 
farms 500 acres and over 
fiscal effort relative to Iowa 
fiscal effort relative to U.S. 
\ worforce outside county 
\ workforce in manufact 
\ workforce in trade 
\ workforce in agriculture 
\workforce in rest (inc.gov.) 
\ income from farming 
Mean 
-172.3232323 
38.2814207 
61. 7185793 
19.4864592 
18.3201464 
2.4682792 
11.1445455 
24.1664646 
12.3933333 
1062 . 42 
17.6696970 
19.5000000 
113.9292929 
123.2626263 
22.2131313 
17.7000000 
20.6505051 
13.4282828 
48.2212121 
5.9832323 
Std Dev 
12.32 
25.3965395 
25 . 3965395 
2.3431980 
3.3834778 
0.6529274 
1.1426279 
4.2265790 
3.6949704 
298.7123075 
4.6244791 
5.4122499 
27.6417506 
29.3742862 
11. 7227900 
5.3998110 
2.7828694 
6.1571104 
5.8213238 
4.2561523 
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APPENDIX VI: CLUSTER AND DISCRJMJNANT 
The following is an abstract of SAS output for cluster and discriminant procedures. 
NCL 
9 
8 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Ward's Minimum Variance Cluster Analysis 
Eigenvalues of the Covariance Matrix 
Eigenvalue 
2.19283 
0.862 16 
0.55483 
0.39018 
Difference 
1.33067 
0.30732 
0.16465 
Proportion 
0.548207 
0.215539 
0.138708 
0.097546 
Cumulative 
0.54821 
0 . 76375 
0 . 90245 
1 . 00000 
Root-Mean-Square Total-Sample Standard Deviation 1 
Root-Mean-Square Distance Between Observations = 2 . 828427 
--Clusters Joined-- FREQ SPRSQ RSQ ERSQ CCC PSF 
CL19 
CLll 
CL20 
CL8 
CL9 
CL? 
CL5 
CL3 
CL4 
CL28 14 0.02187 0.734 0 . 7749 -3.220 31.0 
14 0.02775 0 . 706 0.7558 -3.664 31.2 
19153 
CL12 20 0.02945 0.676 0.7330 -3.927 32.0 
CL15 20 0.03286 0.643 0.7051 -4.057 33.6 
CLlO 41 0.03522 0 .608 0.6697 -3.881 36.5 
CL25 22 0.04854 0 . 560 0.6225 -3.306 40.3 
CL14 57 0.06709 0 . 493 0.5510 -2 .482 46.6 
CL6 77 0 . 19128 0.301 0.4195 -3.687 41.8 
CL2 99 0.30132 0 . 000 0.0000 0 . 000 
Stepwise Discriminant Analysis 
99 Observations 
3 Class Levels 
15 Variable(s) in the Analysis 
0 Variable(s) will be included 
The Method for Selecting Variables will be: BACKWARD 
Significance Level to Stay = 0.2500 
Class Level Information 
CLUSTER Frequency Weight Proportion 
1 22 22 .0000 0.222222 
2 57 57 .0000 0.575758 
3 20 20 . 0000 0.202020 
PST2 
7.5 
6 . 8 
11. 3 
6 . 3 
12.1 
11.9 
20 . 0 
38.0 
41.8 
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Backward Elimination: Step 8 
Statistics for Removal, OF = 2, 89 
Partial 
Variable R**2 
X4 0.3737 
Xl2 0.3020 
X15 0.0441 
X24 0.2693 
X25 0.2600 
X26 0.0877 
X28 0 . 0515 
X33 0.1171 
F 
26.548 
19.258 
2.054 
16.404 
15.638 
4.280 
2.417 
5.903 
Prob > F 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0 . 1343 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0 . 0168 
0.0950 
0 . 0039 
Label 
rev-spending per capita 
pop rural total 
unemployment 
farms less than 50 acres 
farms 500 acres and over 
fiscal effort relat. to Iowa 
\ worforce outside county 
\ income from farming 
No variables can be removed 
Stepwise Discriminant Analysis 
Backward Elimination: Summary 
Variable Number Partial F Prob > Wilks' Prob < 
Step Removed In R**2 Statistic F Lambda Lambda 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
0 15 0.08610134 0.0001 
1 X16 14 0.0010 0.040 0.9611 0.08618476 0 . 0001 
2 X13 13 0.0145 0.610 0.5456 0 . 08745216 0.0001 
3 X27 12 0.0209 0.895 0 . 4124 0.08931598 0.0001 
4 X31 11 0.0151 0.651 0.52 40 0.09068442 0.0001 
5 X32 10 0.0108 0.471 0 .625 7 0.09167858 0.0001 
6 X29 9 0.0101 0.444 0.6430 0.09261411 0.0001 
7 X14 8 0. 0213 0.960 0.3870 0.09463385 0.0001 
Variable Number Canonical Prob > 
Step Removed In Correlation ASCC Label 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
0 15 0.64823250 0.0001 
1 X16 14 0.64803085 0.0001 income per capita 
2 X13 13 0 . 64401563 0 . 0001 enro lled 
3 X27 12 0 . 64233174 0.0001 fiscal effort relat. to U.S. 
4 X31 11 0.63993452 0.0001 \ workforce in agriculture 
5 X32 10 0 . 63868 016 0.0001 \ workforce rest (inc. gov.) 
6 X29 9 0.63741738 0 . 0001 ' workforce in manufac t 7 X14 8 0.63395182 0.0001 a ge 65 + 
CLUSTER 
1 
2 
3 
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Discriminant Analysis 
99 Observations 
8 Variables 
3 Classes 
98 OF Total 
96 OF Within Classes 
2 OF Between Classes 
Class Level Information 
Frequency Weight Proportion 
22 22 . 0000 0 . 222222 
57 57.0000 0 . 575758 
20 20.0000 0 . 202020 
Prior 
Probability 
0 . 222222 
0.575758 
0.202020 
Discriminant Analysis Linear Discriminant Function 
CONSTANT 
X4 
X12 
X15 
X24 
X25 
X26 
X28 
X33 
CONSTANT 
X4 
X12 
X15 
X24 
X25 
X26 
X28 
X33 
1 
-7.60207 
-3.55768 
4.18795 
0.51976 
-0.18330 
2.87961 
-0.56904 
-0.17019 
0.48612 
Label 
CLUSTER 
2 
-0.83378 
0.51849 
-0 . 58226 
0.14140 
-0.86008 
-0.40492 
0.36889 
0.31340 
0 . 41790 
rev-spending per capita 
pop rural total 
unemployment 
farms less than 50 acres 
farms 500 acres and over 
fiscal effort relative to Iowa 
% workforce outside county 
% income from farming 
3 
-7.85534 
2.43574 
-2.94732 
-0.97473 
2.65285 
-2.01354 
-0.42539 
-0.70598 
-1. 72576 
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Discriminant Analysis 
Reeubstitution Sununary using Linear Discriminant Function 
Number of Observations and Percent Classified into CLUSTER: 
From CLUSTER 1 2 3 Total 
1 21 1 0 22 
95.45 4.55 0 . 00 100.00 
2 0 57 0 57 
0.00 100 . 00 0 . 00 100.00 
3 0 0 20 20 
0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Total 21 58 20 99 
Percent 21.21 58.59 20.20 100.00 
Priore 0.2222 0 .5758 0.2020 
Error Count Estimates for CLUSTER: 
1 2 3 Total 
Rate 0.0455 0.0000 0.0000 0.0101 
Priors 0.2222 0.5758 o. 
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Cross-validation Summary using Linear Discriminant Function 
Number of Observations and Percent Classified into CLUSTER: 
From CLUSTER 1 2 3 Total 
1 18 4 0 22 
81.82 18.18 0.00 100 . 00 
2 2 55 0 57 
3.51 96.49 o.oo 100 . 00 
3 0 1 19 20 
o.oo 5 . 00 95.00 100.00 
Total 20 60 19 99 
Percent 20.20 60.61 19 . 19 100.00 
Priors 0.2222 0.5758 0 . 2020 
Error Count Estimates for CLUSTER: 
1 2 3 Total 
Rate 0.1818 0 . 0351 0 . 0500 0.0707 
Priors 0.2222 0.5758 0 . 2020 
Cross-validation Results using Linear Discriminant Function 
Posterior Probability of Membership in CLUSTER: 
Obs From Class i fied 
CLUSTER into CLUSTER 1 2 3 
60 3 2 * 0 . 0000 0.5425 0.4575 
75 1 2 * 0.4015 0.5985 0 . 0000 
80 1 2 * 0. 3725 0.6274 0.0000 
85 2 1 * 0.5157 0.4843 0 . 0000 
87 1 2 * 0.4500 0.5499 0.0000 
95 1 2 * 0 . 1693 0.8242 0.0065 
97 2 1 * o. 7237 0.2762 0.0000 
* Misclassified observat ion 
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APPENDIX VII: SUMMARY STATISTICS BY GROUP 
VIia. Means by group 
-----------------------------------CLUSTER=l-------------------------------
Variable Label N 
X4 
Xl2 
X23 
X24 
X25 
Xl3 
Xl4 
XlS 
Xl6 
Xl7 
X20 
X26 
X27 
X28 
X29 
X30 
X31 
X32 
X33 
X34 
rev-spending per capita 22 
pop rural total 22 
farms number 22 
farms less than 50 acres 22 
farms 500 acres and over 22 
enrolled 22 
age 65 + 22 
unemployment 22 
income per capita 22 
\ HH income less than 12500 22 
\ HH income 50000 + 22 
fiscal effort relative to Iowa 22 
fiscal effort relative to U.S. 22 
\ workforce outside county 22 
\ workforce in manufact 22 
\ workforce in trade 22 
\ workforce in agriculture 22 
\workforce in rest (inc.gov.) 22 
\ income from farming 22 
\ farmarea 22 
Mean 
-1428.82 
87.8886368 
894.3181818 
14. 8272727 
25.4181818 
19.2351015 
20.9942447 
2.3544075 
10.3968182 
27.1681818 
9.7195455 
101. 2272727 
113.8181818 
28.2318182 
14.2318182 
19.6636364 
17.3545455 
48.7500000 
7.0318182 
89 .1181818 
----------------------------------- CLUSTER=2------------------------------
Variable Label N 
X4 
Xl2 
X23 
X24 
X25 
Xl3 
Xl4 
XlS 
Xl6 
Xl7 
X20 
X26 
X27 
X28 
X29 
X30 
X31 
X32 
X33 
X34 
rev-spending per capita 57 
pop rural total 57 
farms number 57 
farms less than 50 acres 57 
farms 500 acres and over 57 
enrolled 57 
age 65 + 57 
unemployment 57 
income per capita 57 
\ HH income less than 12500 57 
\ HH income 50000 + 57 
fiscal effort relative to Iowa 57 
fiscal effort relative to U.S . 57 
\ workforce outside county 57 
\ workforce in manufact 57 
\ workforce in trade 57 
\ workforce in agriculture 57 
\workforce in rest (inc.gov.) 57 
% income from farming 57 
% farmarea 57 
Mean 
69.6666667 
62.3391026 
1068.33 
16.4105263 
18.6824561 
19.5616316 
18.7669977 
2. 5118272 
10.9768421 
24.3326316 
11. 5210526 
119.2982456 
130.0350877 
21.5298246 
18.3456140 
20.4982456 
14.8105263 
46.3456140 
6.9563158 
89.7463158 
--------------------------------------------------------
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-----------------------------------CLUSTER=3------------------------------
Variable Label 
X4 
Xl2 
X23 
X24 
X25 
Xl3 
Xl4 
XlS 
Xl6 
Xl7 
X20 
X26 
X27 
X28 
X29 
X30 
X31 
X32 
X33 
X34 
rev-spending per capita 
pop rural total 
farms number 
farms less than 50 acres 
farms 500 acres and over 
enrolled 
age 65 + 
unemployment 
income per capita 
% HH income less than 12500 
% HH income 50000 + 
fiscal effort relative to Iowa 
fiscal effort relative to U.S. 
% workforce outside county 
% workforce in manuf act 
% workforce in trade 
% workforce in agriculture 
% workforce in rest (inc . gov . ) 
% income from farming 
% farmarea 
N 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
Mean 
520.1500000 
31.1630246 
1230.50 
24 . 3850000 
15.3200000 
19. 5487116 
14.1051119 
2.4694263 
12.4450000 
20 . 3910000 
17.8205000 
112.6000000 
114.3500000 
17.5400000 
19 . 6750000 
22 . 1700000 
5.1700000 
52 . 9850000 
2.0565000 
83.0380000 
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VIIb . Manova results 
The following are summary results for tests of mean differences between groups. Results are shown 
for 4 and 8 variables respectively. 
Manova Test Criteria and F Approximations for 
the Hypothesis of no Overall CLUSTER Effect 
H = Anova SS&CP Matrix for CLUSTER E = Error SS&CP Matrix 
S=2 
Statistic 
Wilks' Lambda 
Pillai's Trace 
Hotelling-Lawley Trace 
Roy ' s Greatest Root 
M=0.5 
Value 
0.11919 
1.147729 
5.150499 
4. 671072 
N=45.5 
F 
44.095 
31. 647 
59.231 
109.77 
Num OF Den OF 
8 186 
8 188 
8 184 
4 94 
Pr > F 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0001 
NOTE: F Statistic for Roy's Greatest Root is an upper bound. 
NOTE: F Statistic for Wilks' Lambda is exact. 
Manova Test Criteria and F Approximations for 
the Hypothesis of no Overall CLUSTER Effect 
H = Anova SS&CP Matrix for CLUSTER E = Error SS&CP Matrix 
S=2 M=2.5 N=43.5 
Statistic Value F Num OF Oen OF Pr > F 
Wilks' Lambda 0.094634 25.039 16 178 0.0001 
Pillai's Trace 1.267904 19.484 16 180 0.0001 
Hotelling-Lawley Trace 5.736094 31.549 16 176 0.0001 
Roy's Greatest Root 4. 964411 55.85 8 90 0.0001 
NOTE: F Statistic for Roy's Greatest Root is an upper bound. 
NOTE: F Statistic for Wilks' Lambda is exact. 
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APPENDIX VIII: BEALE CODE 
VIIIa: Beale Code Categories 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Metropolitan 
1. Large Metropolitan - Counties part of standard metropolitan statistical 
areas (SMSA) with at least 1 million population. 
2. Medium Metropolitan 
population. 
Counties of SMSAs with 250,000 to 999,999 
3. Small Metropolitan - Counties comprising SMSAs with less than 250,000 
population. 
II. Non-metropolitan 
4. Urbanized Adjacent - Counties with an urban population of at least 20,000 
which are adjacent to a metropolitan county. Adjacent is defined as both 
touching an SMSA at more than a single point and having at least 1 percent of 
the labor force commuting to the central county of the SMSA for work. 
5. Urbanized Nonadjacent - Nonadjacent counties with an urban population of 
more than 20,000. 
6. Less Urbanized Adjacent - Adjacent counties with an urban population 
between 2,500 and 19,999. 
7. Less Urbanized Nonadjacent - Nonadjacent counties with an urban population 
between 2,500 and 19,999. 
8. Rural Adjacent - Adjacent counties with no place of 2, 500 or more 
population. 
9. Rural Nonadjacent - Nonadjacent counties with no places of 2 ,500 or more 
population. 
Source: McGranahan et al. (1986) 
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Vlllb: County Beale Code and Cluster 
FIPS COUNTY BEALE CLUSTER 
Code Code 
19001 Adair 8 1 
19003 Adams 9 1 
19005 Allamakee 7 2 
19007 Appanoose 7 2 
19009 Audubon 7 2 
19011 Benton 6 2 
19013 Black Haw 3 3 
19015 Boone 6 2 
19017 Bremer 6 3 
19019 Buchanan 6 2 
19021 Buena Vis 7 2 
19023 Butler 8 2 
19025 Calhoun 9 1 
19027 Carro l l 7 2 
19029 Cass 6 2 
19031 Cedar 6 2 
19033 Cerro Gor 5 3 
19035 Cherokee 7 2 
19037 Chickasaw 7 2 
19039 Clarke 6 2 
19041 Clay 7 2 
19043 Clayton 8 2 
19045 Clinton 4 3 
19047 Crawford 7 2 
19049 Dallas 2 3 
19051 Davis 7 2 
19053 Decatur 9 1 
19055 Delaware 6 2 
19057 Des Moine 5 3 
19059 Dickinson 7 2 
19061 Dubuque 3 3 
19063 Emmet 7 1 
19065 Fayette 6 2 
19067 Floyd 7 2 
19069 Franklin 7 2 
19071 Fremont 9 1 
19073 Greene 7 2 
19075 Grundy 8 2 
19077 Guthrie 8 1 
19079 Hamilton 7 2 
19081 Hancock 7 2 
19083 Hardin 7 2 
19085 Harrison 6 1 
19087 Henry 7 2 
19089 Howard 7 2 
19091 Humboldt 7 2 
90 
19093 Ida 8 l 
19095 Iowa 8 2 
19097 Jackson 6 2 
19099 Jasper 6 3 
19101 Jefferson 7 2 
19103 Johnson 3 3 
19105 Jones 6 2 
19107 Keokuk 9 l 
19109 Kossuth 7 2 
19111 Lee 5 2 
19113 Linn 3 3 
19115 Louisa 8 2 
19117 Lucas 6 2 
19119 Lyon 6 2 
19121 Madison 6 2 
19123 Mahaska 7 2 
19125 Marion 6 3 
19127 Marshall 5 3 
19129 Mills 6 l 
19131 Mitchell 7 2 
19133 Monona 6 1 
19135 Monroe 7 2 
19137 Montgomer 6 2 
19139 Muscatine 4 3 
19141 O'Brien 7 2 
19143 Osceola 7 2 
19145 Page 7 2 
19147 Palo Alto 7 1 
19149 Plymouth 6 2 
19151 Pocahonta 9 1 
19153 Polk 2 3 
19155 Pottawatt 2 1 
19157 Poweshiek 7 2 
19159 Ringgold 9 1 
19161 Sac 9 1 
19163 Scott 2 3 
19165 Shelby 6 2 
19167 Sioux 7 3 
19169 Story 4 3 
19171 Tama 6 1 
19173 Taylor 9 1 
19175 Union 7 2 
19177 Van Buren 9 1 
19179 Wapello 5 3 
19181 Warren 2 3 
19183 Washingto 6 2 
19185 Wayne 9 1 
19187 Webster 5 2 
19189 Winnebago 7 2 
19191 Winneshie 7 2 
19193 Woodbury 3 3 
19195 Worth 9 1 
19197 Wright 7 2 
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